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ABSTRACT
The Brazilian Northeast has striking problems such as
illiteracy and infant mortality. This research shows how
three successful local governments were able to cope with
those problems within their scarce resources. Although
Icapui, CroatA, and Horizonte set health and education as
their priorities, they followed different paths to achieve
common goals.
The findings showed that a long struggle for
emancipation taught inhabitants to stay mobilized around
demands. This inflicted steady pressure on mayors for
tangible and quick administrative results. The government
used simple and imaginative ways to improve public sector
performance: 1) clear criteria to hire public employees such
as public contests; 2) investments on career and salaries by
intensive training efforts, improved working conditions, and
payment of above average wages; 3) information evenly
distributed among civil servants and between population and
government; 4) introduction of participatory mechanism in
the administration such as municipal councils resulting in
decentralization of decision power; 5) use of institutional
framework to explore untapped sources of municipal revenue;
and 6) municipalization of health and education services.
Thus, in less than five years these local governments
drastically reduced illiteracy, obtaining 100% of school
enrollment and 50% reduction of school dropout rates by
adopting new educational methods and techniques, providing
free transportation to school, adapting the school calendar
to the communities' needs. and improving teachers'
qualifications. They reduced the infant mortality rate and
the incidence of work-related diseases by assuring universal
coverage of medical assistance. Consequently, the three
municipios gained the necessary legitimacy to push further
reforms.
Although these three cases showed contrasting ways of
decentralizing decision power locally, and different levels
of participatory mechanisms included in their public
management, all three improved significantly education and
health, setting patterns that are already being emulated by
other municipios in CearA and Brazil.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Judith Tendler
Title: Professor of Political Economy
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ACRONYMS and ABBREVIATIONS
ACICA - Cultural Association of Icapul,
(Associagco Cultural de Icapul, founded in 1980).
AEUA - Aracati Students Association,
(Associag&o de Estudantes de Aracati).
ARISA and Mar d'Espanha - Enterprises from the state of So
Paulo.
APRECE - Mayors' Association of the State of Ceara
(AssociaCgo de Prefeitos do Estado do Ceara).
ATMSC - Municipal Technical Advisers,
(Assessoria Tcnica Municipal S/C Limitada).
BNH - National Housing Bank
(Banco Nacional da Habitacgo).
CIC - Industrial Center of Ceara
(Centro Industrial do CearA).
CIDADANIA - Citizenship Planning Advisers for Public Policy,
(Planejamento e Assessoria em Politicas Pblicas S/C
Ltda.).
COPAM - J. Macedo Enterprises.
CPO-D - Ratio of cavities, lost, and treated teeth,
(Cariados, Perdidos, Obturados - Dentes)
EDUCAR - Educational Foundation
(Fundag&o EDUCAR).
FAE - Students' Assistance Foundation
(Fundag&o de Assistfncia ao Estudante).
FCBIA - Brazilian Center for Assistance to Child and
Youth Foundation
(Fundag&o Centro Brasileiro para a Infancia e
Adolescencia).
FNDE - National Fund for the Development of the Northeast
(Fundo Nacional para o Desenvolvimento do Nordeste).
FPE - State Participation Fund
(Fundo de Participaq&o dos Estados).
FPM - Municipal Participation Fund
kFundo de Participaq&o dos Municipios).
5
IBAMA - Brazilian Institute for the Environment
(Instituto Brasileiro do Meio-Ambiente).
ICMS - Commercial and Services Taxes
(Imposto de Circulaq&o de Mercadorias e Servigos).
INAMPS - National Institute for Medical Assistance and
Social Security
(Instituto Nacional de Previddncia e Assistdncia
Social).
IPLANCE - Cear& Institute for Planning Foundation
(Furdag&o Instituto de Planejamento do Cear&).
IPTU - Urban Property Tax
(Imposto Predial e Territorial Urbano).
ITR - Rural Property Tax
(Imposto territorial Rural).
MASA - Edson Queiroz Enterprises.
PDS - Social Democratic Party
(Partido Democrftico Social).
PETROBRAS - Brazilian Petrol Company
(Companhia Brasileira de Petr6leo).
PMDB - Brazilian Democratic Movement Party
(Partido do Movimento DemocrAtico Brasileiro).
PPE - Publicity, Promotions, and Events
(Publicidade, Promogoes, e Eventos).
PSDB - Brazilian Social Democracy Party
(Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira).
PT - Workers' Party
(Partido dos Trabalhadores).
SESP - Foundation of the Special Service of Public Health
(Fundagqo do Servigo Especial de Sadde Pblica).
SIA - Ambulatory Information System
(Sistema de Informag&o Ambulatorial).
SIH - Hospital Internment System
(Sistema de Internamento Hospitalar).
SILOS - Local Health Systems
(Sistemas Locais de Sadde).
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SOCEMA - Cear& Society for Culture and Environmental
Protection
(Sociedade Cearense de Defesa da Cultura e do Meio
Ambiente).
SUS - Health Unified System
(Sistema nico de Sadde).
UNE - National Students' Union
(Uni&o Nacional dos Estudantes).
UNICEF - United Nations Children's Fund
(Fundo das Nacoes Unidas para a Crian9a).
WHO - World Health Organization
(Organizagao Mundial de Sadde).
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INTRODUCTION
This thesis presents three cases of outstanding local
governments in small municipios1 in the state of Ceard,
Brazil. Icapui, Croatd, and Horizonte used ingenuity and
simple measures to solve common public sector problems
within constraints such as a scarce budget, an adverse
political structure, and restricted managerial and
professional expertise. Although the new Constitution of
1988 conferred greater autonomy and resources to all 4,493
municipios in the Brazilian federation, only a few local
governments (around 10%) improved their efficiency as
quickly as these three.
I looked at how these municipios dealt with
institutional innovations, decentralization of services, and
how their local governments introduced participatory
mechanisms in their bureaucracy. Just prior to this study
all three municipios had recently gone through a process of
splitting from bigger municipalities, which led to an
interesting pattern of pressure for good performance in
1 Brazil has three administrative levels, federal, state, and municipal. The Municfpio is the owest
administrative unit. It includes the municipality seat, districts, and the surrounding county. The
local government administers both the urban areas and the rural zone. Municfpios have a certain
degree of autonomy, they can decide about their budgets without approval of the other two higher
levels: the state and the federal goverrnments. Each four years their inhabitants elect mayors and
city councilmen (named vereadores), who share the responsibilities of the Local government. Mayors
administer the municfpio with their secretariats, and the city council takes care of legislative
matters, such as elaborating city's laws, and approving the municipal budget. The judiciary has a
different subdivision from the legislative and executive branches of government. There are 4,493
municfpios distributed among Brazil's 27 states and the federal district. Ceara has 178 of these
municfpios, 4% of the Brazilian total.
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general, and in particular for better provision of public
services. The reasons underlying their success will be
explored using the fields of education and health as
illustrations.
Education and health services seem unlikely to bring
popularity to local governments. These programs are rarely
a priority with any local administration because Brazilian
politicians typically regarded them as difficult to conduct
successfully. Politicians restrict services just for their
proteges, and use the very lack of services to increase
their manipulative power. Similarly, the planning
literature considers these as "soft sectors" because they
take longer to show tangible results.2 Instead, municipal
politicians prefer to invest in big infrastructure projects:
roads, bridges, public squares (usually with luminous water-
fountains), or huge public buildings. Yet in contrast to
politicians' ambivalence toward these sectors, Icapui,
Croat&, and Horizonte stand out precisely because they
picked exactly education and health as their main focus.
CearA has 4% of the country's total population, and 10%
of the two million Brazilian children do not go to schools,
(which are 200,000 illiterate children). Yet, in the last
four years none of the children out of school lived in these
municipios.3 The level of health care is also outstanding
2 See Hirschman (1988), Ostrom, Schoeder & Wynne (1990), Sanyal (1990), and Tendler (1991).
3 Jornat Naciona 01/20/1993.
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in the municipios I studied. The 1992 cholera epidemics
tested the health care structure of CroatA, Horizonte, and
Icapul. Although the Northeast situation was serious, with
more than 23,856 cases reported by November, these three
municipios had none.4
Within four years, these three municipios also brought,
among other things, electrification, water, and telephones
to serve their towns and districts. Furthermore, these
administrations improved road conditions, using local labor
to pave them with materials locally available (stones or
bricks are more affordable than asphalt or concrete).5
These achievements are even more striking because until
recently, the public sector had been performing poorly
within the region's archaic political structure of
clientelism and patronage. The state of Ceard had the
strongest trend of influence peddling, corruption and
nepotism in Brazil.6 The power of entrenched oligarchies
extended to the state's remotest places. Traditional
political leaders from important land-owning families had a
pervasive hold on politics: they served as members in the
National Congress, or as Ministers of the Federal
4 Jornal Nacional 11/19/1992.
5 Horizonte, for example, invested simultaneously in many sectors. Electrification grew 350X, and,
since 1987 consuners of electricity jumped from 700 to 2,500. The communication system installed
370 new telephones, which is impressive because most small towns have only a public post. Croati
built from 89 to 91, eight wells, five public water sources, four reservoirs, 12,200m of water
connections to residences and business, 44,000 m2 of roads' pavements, and other urbanization works
in the Last five years.
6 See Furtado (1975) for an overview of the Brazilian economic and political situation, and Johnson
(1971) for rural relationships in the Brazilian Northeast, and Fox (1992) for a good description of
the Mexican situation of change in traditional practices due to the lack of mechanisms against non-
compliance to previous patron-client type of relationships.
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Government. Local political chiefs and landowners--"the
colonels"7--dominated over the whole state of Ceard.
How were the municipios of Icapul, Croat&, and
Horizonte able to successfully challenge and resist this
traditional trend of nepotism and corruption? How was good
government possible in these cases? Moreover, why did these
three administrations choose the "invisible" sectors of
health and education as administrative priorities? This
study identifies and explains the features of local
government in Icapul, Croat&, and Horizonte that contributed
to their success. The study then draws lessons that may be
more generally applicable to local governments elsewhere.
The thesis will demonstrate how and why the municipios
of Icapul, Croat&, and Horizonte carried out good management
exactly in those sectors where the traditional patronage
politics of Cear& was most pervasive: education and health.
These local administrations inverted previous trends by
enforcing a more pragmatic use of resources, clear criteria
of management, universal access to public services, and
eliciting strong accountability of governmental actions. In
contrast to what most mayors do in Cear&, the mayors of
these municipios rebelled against entrenched leaders, and
set priorities that did not replicate the common
Northeastern practices of hiring friends and kin, or using
public funds unscrupulously. How could these mayors secure
7 Political chiefs and landowners of the local oligarchy.
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broad electoral support for these reforms while acting
against some of the most powerful and entrenched local
elites?
In Chapter One I will present indicators of success of
these local governments. In Chapter Two, decentralization
of different levels of public services, funding, and fiscal
performance will be discussed. I will show in Chapter Three
how the struggle for emancipation enhanced pressure for good
performance locally, and analyze how this success
contributed to build legitimacy, accountability, and
reinforced changes in the local government's public
administration. Chapter Four will put together the
explanations for these governments' impressive achievements,
stressing that even accidental or idiosyncratic reasons for
success may lead to replicable strategies.
Although all three municipalities succeeded
administratively, Icapul started its local government reform
earlier (in 1986), and advanced more than the other two.
Therefore, I will use the case of Icapui for primary
description, and compare it with Croat& and Horizonte as
secondary references.
Methodology
I conducted three months of field research from June to
August 1992 to understand why and how these municipios
(shown in table 1) had achieved and sustained good standards
of education and health, widely recognized throughout Ceard
and Brazil. I explored the causes of efficiency inthe
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provision of these services, as examples of good municipal
administration.
TABLE 1 1990 ESTIMATED POPULATION, DENSITY, and AREA
of BRAZIL, CEARA, CROATA, HORIZONTE, and ICAPUt
BRAZIL CEARA CROATA HORIZONTE ICAPUI
POPULATION
Rural 25% 36.5% 85% 12% 89%
Urban 75% 63.5% 15% 88% 11%
Total 150,368,000 6,472,000 14,826 18,262 13,665
AREA (Km2) 8,511,966 146,817 621 192 406
MEAN DENSITY
(Inhabitants/Km2)
Total 18 44 24 95 34
Source: IPLANCE 1992.
My findings about municipal administration are based on
148 open-ended interviews (tables 5 and 6 in Annex One),
plus 40 in-depth interviews with public employees and
residents of Icapui, Croat&, and Horizonte, and on data
collected from newspapers, journals and official
publications of federal, state, and municipal governments.
For the three municfpios I studied in depth, I cross-
checked my data at the municipal level with different
categories of people and several residents. Especially with
five high school and five elementary school students in each
town, to see their opinion about the schools, teachers and
how satisfied they were with the educational system.
Furthermore I contacted two ex-mayors, four candidates for
the forthcoming elections, one planning assistant, and one
13
federal revenue service public servant. I also talked to
patients from hospitals and health posts, who evaluated the
services they received. I interviewed managers of textile
and boat construction businesses, five restaurant owners,
three bar owners, four small farmers, two fishers, seven
presidents of neighborhood associations and workers' unions,
to evaluate how they view their governments. Catholic
Church people who had an important role providing education
and health also commented on recent changes, and elderly
people told me the history of these towns.
In addition, I traveled by bus across the state,
deepening my understanding of everyday life in these small
towns through personal observation. More formal contact
with high ranking state government employees in Fortaleza
gave me a broad view of municipal administration in Cear&.
I reviewed the literature on Brazilian fiscal federalism,
citizenship rights and social movements to frame my
questions about mechanisms of popular participation recently
included in some local governments. I also reviewed the
literature on primary health care and education to
understand the public policy responses to the emerging
pressures for schools and health services that occurred in
these municipios.
Before choosing where I would do my field work, I
visited 15 municipios--Aracati, Canind6, Crateds, Eus6bio,
Guaraciaba do Norte, Ipd, Pacajds, Quiterianopolis, QuixadA,
Quixeramobim, Santa Quit6ria, Senador Pompeu, Sobral, Taut,
14
and Tiangu&--that gave me a general idea of what local
government in the state looked like. Then, I chose Icapui,
Croatd, and Horizonte out of all 178 municipios of Cear&,
because they had solved problems that were common to most of
the 4,493 Brazilian municipios.8 They set a pattern of
governance that other municipios in the state tried to
emulate.
I used one week in IguatQ to contrast findings in a
large town, and one month in Fortaleza, the state capital,
to gather data from state government agencies (see tables Annex
One). I also interviewed the ex-Secretaries of Social Action
and Education, the president of the State Council of
Education, seven professors of the Federal University of
CearA, a psychiatrist from the Center for Family Studies,
and four UNICEF health and education consultants to the
state and local governments. I got data from ATMSC
(Municipal Technical Advisers) a private firm of accounting
working with these municipios, and two NGOs, CIDADANIA
(Planning Advisers for Public Policy), and INSTITUTO
EQUATORIAL (Equatorial Institute of Contemporaneous Culture
and Entrepreneurial Practices).
The achievements in the health and education sectors
will be presented in the next chapter.
8 90% of the Brazilian towns have Less than 20,000 inhabitants, therefore the findings of these
research showing mechanisms of decentralization and how ocal governments operate in these
municipalities can easily be generalized to most of Brazilian unicfpios. Municipalities of this
size permit easier overall picture of different sectors at the same time. Links between different
departments and agencies are faster to identify and to follow than in bigger cities.
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CHAPTER ONE
Indicators of Municipal Performance
In this chapter I will first present these municipios'
progress in education, then in health, and in subsequent
chapters explain the reasons behind this sudden shift from
traditional public administration to the new local
government's performance and attitude.
As mandated by the new Brazilian Constitution, the
municipios gained autonomy in the areas of political and
fiscal control.9 The Constitution stresses the obligations
which family, society, and the government each have towards
providing health and education to children.10 Municipal
responsibilities shifted from shared duties with the state
to the sole municipal provision of primary education and
health care.1 1 Before the recent changes, the procedures to
get disbursements delivered to local governments depended
mainly on mayors and secretaries, who personally negotiated
with high rank federal and state heads of agencies. Such
procedures had often led to corruption and influence
peddling. Now, as municipal autonomy grew with
correspondent compulsory transfers of revenues from the
federal government to the municipios, there are minimum
9 See Chapter Two for the FPM share, and other sources of municipal revenue
10 Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil, ArticLe number 227, of 10-05-88.
11 Education and health had many dimensions which were supposedly provided with mutual cooperation,
such as building and maintenance of schools and health posts. Training for professionals and staff
in both sectors were also shared, as well as inoculation campaigns.
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conditions for municipios to operate within serious
performance standards. Thus, these constitutional changes
allowed for decisions at the local level to become based
more on professional abilities, greatly reducing patronage
and nepotism. Yet, only a few municipios immediately
followed the new pattern of administration. The elected
governments in Croat&, Horizonte, and Icapul did that after
emancipation.12 For example, they assured within their
possibilities that all school-age children receive good
public education, and that the whole population receive
health care.13
Icapul, Croat&, and Horizonte were respectively the
"backward" districts of Aracati, Guaraciaba do Norte, and
Pacajfis. Before emancipation, the very lack of public
services in these districts meant that the improvements in
the sectors of health and education would be quite
"visible." As districts they had lacked enough schools and
teachers, and people needed political influence or
"godfathers" to enter schools. In fact, the educational
staff had almost no qualified personnel, and those who had
"hot shoulders,"--a local way of saying political
protection--would not work properly because they knew their
jobs were secured by influential contacts.
12 The process of emancipation will be detailed in Chapter Three.
13 Di&rio do Nordeste Fortaleza, CE. Tera-feira, 21 de Juiho de 1992.
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Medical assistance was even worse. At most, the doctor
serving the town would come once a week or once in two weeks
to the health post, that was distant from most homes. These
three governments made a strategic decision to deliver key
services to everyone by providing health posts, schools,
teachers, and doctors evenly distributed among all
communities. In this way they would be dismantling a long
time structure of dependency to the former political chiefs.
The rule in the interior of Cear& was the exchange of
electoral support for a pair of shoes, a plate of food, a
box of medicines, or rides in ambulances. Resources and
benefits remained only in the seat of municipios, or in the
districts that supported the current politicians in power.
There was discrimination against districts where other
political parties had electoral supremacy. After political
campaigns elected mayors and city councilors withheld money
from districts where they did not receive support from
voters. Schools and health posts initiated during electoral
periods remained unfinished unless districts compensated for
it by getting outside support from political factions
opposing local politicians. Eventually, a federal
representative (deputado federal) who represented the
opposition would get funds to complete a health post in a
neglected district. People proudly emphasized "it was done
against the will of the mayor."
The governments of Icapui, Horizonte, and Croat&
reacted against this prior tendency of neglect inflicted by
18
politicians who monopolized services by distributing jobs
and placing privileged children in the few available
schools. Although most politicians dislike procedures that
reduce their power, new leaders had to take in participation
and popular control to dispute elections successfully. The
process of emancipation had built greater political
awareness in these three municipios, and once their local
governments set specific goals for improving health and
education corruption in the political behavior was greatly
reduced. The wide access of inhabitants to these services
ended their use as favors or privileges. The new political
leaders got support from local residents shortly after they
changed the previous pattern and adopted clear criteria to
hire teachers, doctors, and nurses. Transparency in the
process of delivering public services makes easier for
everyone to know what they should be getting from the
government.
Over the last five years the three municipios I studied
performed among the top 10% in investments in their public
services. The growing accountability of the governments of
Icapul, Horizonte, and Croat& earned them many honors. The
Industrial Center of Cear& (CIC) nominated them for their
Merit in Political Ethics in 1992.14 The Workshop of
Municipal Administrations of the Interior15 listed these
14 0 Povo. Fortaleza, CE. Saturday, August, 15, 1992. Ano LXV. No 21979.
15 "Administrales unicipais do Interior: Trithando o Exito" promoted by the Equatorial Institute
of Contemporaneous Culture and Entrepreneurial Practices.
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three municipios among the best 10 in the state. The agency
for Publicity, Promotions, and Events (PPE) sets annually a
commission of distinguished public figures to choose the
best 25 mayors of Cear&. In 1991 and 1992, the mayors of
Icapul, Croat&, and Horizonte appeared among the best. The
mayor of Horizonte (in 1992) presided over the Mayors'
Association of Cear& (APRECE), a forum where state mayors
interact and exchange experiences.
United Nations Children's Funds (UNICEF) gave Icapul
the Child and Peace Prize of 1991 for its exceptional
respect for children's right to education. State wide
public recognition appeared not only in newspapers and
magazines, but also in the interviews I conducted throughout
the state with different categories of people. One resident
said: "prizes such as the UNICEF Child and Peace, the Merit
in Political Ethics, Best Mayor, and awards for vaccination
campaigns show our good work." The recognition of various
international, national, state agencies and organizations to
Icapui's work stimulated Croat& and Horizonte to likewise
significantly improve their administrations in the same
sectors.16 Most other recently emancipated municipalities
had no such impressive outcomes. The fact that neighboring
districts of other municipios want to join these successful
ones is another indicator of their wide recognition.
16 It stimulated others too, such as Maranguape, Pereiro, Guaramiranga, Baturit6, Santana do AcaraO,
Brejo Santo, but they were slower in presenting their results.
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Achievements in Education
In education, these governments started operating with
two main goals:
The First Goal Was Universal Access to Public
Education: These three municipios reached in four years 100%
school enrollment compared with less than 20% of enrollment
rate before the emancipation. Icapul took seriously its
slogan "school for all" with an increase of 520% in its
school enrollment in six years, between 1986 and 1991. The
number of students grew from 800 in 1985 to over 4,200 in
1992.
TABLE 2 Total of Students Enrolled in ICAPUf 1986/1992
GRADES 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
Pre-school 99 141 164 190 296 373
Kindergarten 1,141 430 514 659 818 882 853
First 540 1,144 543 743 681 775 682
Second 335 475 575 702 606 604 560
Third 210 247 334 409 422 528 506
Fourth 151 195 179 247 290 329 368
Fifth 110 100 160 168 180 249 262
Sixth 73 96 94 128 139 120 186
Seventh 52 60 90 87 77 110 103
Eight 22 54 46 81 66 101 120
1st Pedagogic 58 55 19 26 13 8
2nd Pedagogic 28 19 17 10 11
3rd Pedagogic 20 14 11 10
High School:l 1st 47 79 71 88
Second 13 23 50
Third 28 17
TOTAL 2,634 2,938 3,059 3,493 3,618 4,150 4,197
Source: Prefeitura unicipal de Icapuf.
Prior to 1986 when the first mayor took office, there
were only eight schools open, which was an insufficient
number to allow for all children and teenagers to attend.
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Now 34 public schools with 194 municipal teachers assist
100% of the population from pre-school to senior high
school. School enrollment in Horizonte grew 327% in four
years, from 1,170 in 1988 to 5,000 students in 1992. The
number of students in Croat& grew from 2,557 in 1988 to over
4,483 students in 1992. Croat& has 32% of its total
population attending school compared to 17% before
emancipation.17
TABL 3 Nubro tdns colCasomTahr
TABLE 3 Number of Students, Schools, Classrooms, Teachers
and Percentage Increase after Emancipation
CROATA HORIZONTE ICAPUI
1988 1991 % 1988 1991 % 1986 1991 %
STUDENTS 2,557 4,483 570 1,170 4,968 327 800 4,197 520
SCHOOLS 20 54 37 30 38 21 8 34 77
CLASSROOMS 54 83 35 33 67 51 16 74 21
TEACHERS - 152 - - 157 - 32 194 17
Source: IPLANCE 1992.
To accomplish this goal all three municipios needed to
improve the general conditions of education (see table 2) . I
will describe how their local governments did visible
improvements tackling first the lack of schools and
teachers, and then making sure that children had conditions
to attend school by providing transportation, school lunch
and other measures to reduce the previous high rates of
school drop-out. These three local governments adopted the
following solutions:
17 The rate is even higher considering that it includes the population of areas in dispute with the
neighboring municipalities of Ipueiras and IpCI.
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1) Adaptation of the Existing Physical Structure -
These municipios had insufficient and deteriorated school
buildings, although their priority was not necessarily to
build new schools they had to meet an unsatisfied demand for
classrooms. For instance, in 1985, Icapul had schools for
only one fifth of its children in contrast to a coverage of
50% in the municipio's seat Aracatf. Nevertheless the
precarious conditions of the eight available buildings, they
had to be used on an interim basis while the administration
raised funds to repair them. First, the municipal
government had to rent houses from private owners, because
it had no capital funds to build schools. While the
government negotiated transfers from the state Department of
Education to build new schools, the Catholic Church lent
parochial space in each community to be used as additional
classrooms.
2) Provision of Free Transportation for Students - The
three municipios adopted the idea of free transportation to
assure that all students, even from distant districts, could
attend school in each municipio's center. Contrary to the
custom of using the access to school as personal favors, the
politicians of these three towns used money from the
municipal revenue to do this. Only recently (in 1992),
complementary resources came from the state government for
expenditures with students' transportation. The Municipal
Department of Education has contracted a private firm since
1989 to provide transportation for Icapul's children.
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Croat& bought a bus, and a jeep to transport its children
where roads are bad. Only Horizonte could afford a brand
new micro-bus, that is used also to transport teachers from
Fortaleza to give evening classes in the high school.
Both solutions, the purchase of vehicles or contracting
a private firm, incur similar and substantial costs whether
in maintenance of old buses or in rental fees. For example,
Icapul spent US $3,590 in June of 92 in bus rental.18 All
participants in the meetings to decide about local
government's expenditures had agreed that, since education
was a priority and children should attend school, the only
way of achieving this goal was by providing transportation
from the place of residence to the nearest school.
Considering that Icapul has 52% of its population bellow 20
years of age, distributed among 22 communities, the money
spent on transportation is justified. One educational clerk
said: "The strain of children walking on the hot sands of
Icapui justify our decision in providing transportation to
make public education available to the remotest places."
One mayor commented: "The sight of a broken down bus filled
with children on their way to school illustrates our
troubles while assuring that all children attend school."
The idea of free transportation complements other
educational improvements, and increased significantly school
attendance, thus its high costs are justified. This idea
18 Cr$ 14 000,000.00 when each dollar was worth Cr$ 3,900.00.
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has rapidly spread to other places of the state, and I saw
it operating also in Iguatd and Guaraciaba do Norte.
3) Selection of Qualified Professionals - All three
municipios established public contests to hire teachers in
contrast to the previous practice of hiring friends and
political proteges. The local government lately extended
the practice of using merit ased competitions to hire
public servants for other sectors too. The public contest
was a major turning point in public management because it
interrupted the vicious cycle of patronage that existed
before, and ensured a minimum standard of training among
those selected. In the education sector for example, the
government advertised the contest in newspapers and it was
open to anyone with the required qualifications, which
included proper training or at least a high school degree.
A commission of state employees conducted the exams and
evaluated titles. The fact that they were not linked to
municipal politics assured neutrality in choosing those most
qualified for the position. Furthermore, it freed mayors
and secretaries from old pressures to use their power to
benefit friends and relatives, and helped to keep corruption
away from the public sector.
4) Improvements in Teachers' Careers and Salaries -
These local governments pay their teachers with salaries
above the minimum-wage, which is the state average for
teachers.19 For example the administrations of Horizonte
. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~,.
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and Icapul set a new municipal plan for career and wages.
Public employees won improved working conditions because
these governments had decided to attract good professionals
for the public sector. They additionally provide
transportation and housing as benefits to keep teachers
working.
5) Teachers' Training - In addition to the open
selective process and high wages, these local governments
encouraged training for teachers already on the job. Most
available teachers in the interior are "lay teachers," known
for having only four years of elementary school. To improve
the quality of education these governments made salaries
proportional to the teachers' qualifications. Wages became
correspondent to the years of schooling.20 To cope with the
lack of skilled people, the government of Icapuf, Croat& and
Horizonte insisted on training and enrolled as many teachers
as possible. Although training courses were usually short
and some functioned on weekends, teachers were scarce hence
these cities only could maintain teachers outside the
classrooms for a limited time. Indeed these governments
valued professionals, encouraging their public servants with
incentives to enhance their qualifications by offering them
food coupons and bus tickets to attend state training
19 The minimum wage in Brazil is meant to be equivalent to USS100 since January of 1993 but
inflation of around 28% a month, it barely keeps its value as such, for instance when at first of
January it was settled as CrS 1,250,000.00 = $100.00, at the end of February it was Cr$ 1,250,000.00
= $60.00, and at the end of March CrS1,250,000.00 = 43.00.
20 High school teachers need College education and Icapuf, Horizonte, and Croata already have
training for teachers Pedagogic course "Curso Normal."
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programs and professional meetings in Fortaleza, Limoeiro or
Messejana.21 For example, the municipal Department of
Education in Icapul sent lay teachers to an intensive
program (LOGUS) in Aracati to finish high school.
In addition to training provided outside, these three
towns also started secondary schools to form their own
teachers. To do that they had to recruit and hire outside
college graduates to teach in their new course.22 For
example, Icapul started its secondary school in 1988, and
had its first High School graduation in 1990. Icapul also
encouraged its high school graduates to enter college in
Mossor6.U The approval in the "vestibular" of 12 Icapui
high school graduates was an impressive result.24
The Second Goal Was to Increase Literacy: The three
municipios also reduced illiteracy quite dramatically.
Icapul ranks well above the Cear&'s average adult literacy
rate of 60%, at almost 80%. Although lower than Icapul,
Croat& and Horizonte also improved their adult literacy
rates by 10% and 12% respectively. These local governments
used the following ways to reach this goal:
21 During my field work health professionals went to meetings in Fortaleza, Belo Horizonte, the
capital of the state of Minas Gerais. A group of students Left for a sports' competition, and
another for a theater presentation in adjacent towns. Teachers attended a training program in
Fortaleza.
22 The implications of non-local personnel will be discussed in Chapter Three.
23 Nossor6 in the state of Rio Grande do Norte is the nearest town that has college. ossor6 is
nearer than Fortaleza or IguatO. The first students who graduate in High School of Icapuf receive
transportation to attend college there. College degree is a valuable title and gives high status in
Brazil.
24 Vestibular" is a tough competition to enter college because few students get in.
27
1) Adoption of New Techniques like the "Culture
Circles" and "Constructivism." One important educational
innovation by the Education Department of Icapui was the
adoption of a new method (Constructivism) that made children
enjoy being in school. The story of Honorato shows how
children got attached to Icapul's schools after reform.
Honorato moved with his family to another town and could not
adapt to his new school. He wrote to Icapui asking to come
back, stay, and be adopted by the town. The local
administration deliberated with leaders in the communities
before accepting the responsibility of bringing him up. The
city adopted him, and he is currently living with the
Secretary of Health.25
The "Constructivism" method has its roots in Piaget and
other educational philosophers. It approaches education
comprehensively and handles the learning process around the
chi]d's own environment. Inclusion of cultural traits in
the learning process eases the interaction between teachers
and students, making the whole process more effective. For
instance, fishers' themes, or agriculture related issues are
used as motivation to introduce new topics. Students are
stimulated to bring their everyday habits in the writing,
telling stories that are intelligible to their classmates.
This method also relies on teachers' creativity. The
capacity of Icapul teachers of adapting the method to their
25 The municipal government set a minimum wage to pay for his Living expenses, and he directs one of
the city's street theater groups. He writes plays, promotes the rehearsals for Local and
neighboring cities' presentations.
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children's environment touched most observers. In a
training session, when the speaker was stressing the need
for creativity, one teacher told of her own method. She
made a song to teach letters using all sorts of common
household objects. She reported that the children seemed to
learn much quicker since the letters suddenly had more
meaning. She intuitively realized the need to innovate and
revert from the usual teaching procedures by doing simple
things as introducing games to teach numbers. In Icapul,
also because this new method gives more stimulus than the
traditional way of teaching, the first and second grade
students and teachers developed their own text book.
Consultants from UNICEF and the Federal University of Ceara
are considering its publication adapted to the realities of
other towns in the state.
"Constructivism" got to Icapul by chance. The southern
state of Rio Grande do Sul was the first to use it in Brazil
since 1985. One of its leading educators introduced this
educational technique to some of Icapul's teachers while in
vacations there. It responded Icapul's demands reducing
flunking. CearA's Department of Education created a study
group to launch Constructivism in other municipios in the
state. Teachers undergo training to use the method.
Horizonte was the first to send observers to Icapui before
replicating the method in its schools, and college students
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from Fortaleza frequently come to observe Icapui's
educational experience.26
Another innovation was the adoption of Paulo Freire's
culture circles--"cfrculos de cultura"--a program based on a
dynamic method to teach adults how to read and write. The
impact of the Paulo Freire method was first to increase
adult literacy, and second, to open a channel for changing
political relations by giving information to previously
excluded groups. The circles of culture, besides motivating
parents to learn, encouraged their participation in the
school's affairs, and in administrative matters of their
communities too. Icapui since 1987, and then Croata in 1990
started successfully their circles, as one teacher stated:
"Old parrots do learn to talk! or better yet, old people do
learn to write and read!"
2) School Calendar Adjusted to the Communities'
Economic Needs. Part of the reason for the low school
attendance in Cear& is that families need their children's
labor during the agricultural season. In rural communities
the school attendance drop to half during the cashew harvest
like in many of Icapul's communities.27 Children had to
collect cashews from October till January to increase their
families' income. The government responded to this
26 Visits come from within and outside the state. When I was there 35 teachers from five
Northeastern states visited the schools of Redonda to observe their educational experience.
27 Fishing represents the Icapuf's main activity since 1970, with 50X of the population dependent on
fishing for their livelihood. Nevertheless, one fifth of the municfpio's territory comprises cashew
enterprises, besides ong areas with coconut trees, and a smaller but significant portion now is
producing melon and watermelon for export.
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constraint by instituting a school break. In this area
school starts in January and ends in October. In contrast,
the period that takes students away from classrooms to work
in the fields in CroatA is the rainy season that goes from
January through May. Recognizing this fact, the municipal
Department of Education in Croat& decided since 1989 to
start classes in May. Icapul and Croat& dropout rates
declined 50% after their school calendars changed in
response to the need for seasonal work in agriculture.28
This responsiveness of the school calendar to economic
needs of the communities made Croat&'s rate of absence per
student to drop to an average of 0.8% monthly, only 6.4%
yearly compared to 6.25% monthly before the calendar change.
The school calendar adaptation turned absenteeism down to
the United Nations' ideal rate of 6% yearly. Horizonte
population is mainly urban (see tabLe 1) and does not need a
calendar adaptation. The adoption of simple measures such
as the calendar change solved problems that a common
curriculum does not address. Since municipios were granted
autonomy they could bring each of their obstacles into
consideration and design accordingly their educational
programs. Mandatory education and legal mandates are not
enough to solve educational problems.
3) The Relevance of Involving the Community in School
Affairs. People really valued education for their children
28 Students and parents were conpietely satisfied with the measure, but some teachers complain about
having different eaves from other teachers.
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because it meant future access to jobs and broader economic
opportunities. Therefore parents were willing to go to the
school meetings because they felt the local government would
respond to suggestions as had been demonstrated by the case
of the calendar adaptation in Icapul and Croat&. One
household head put it simply as that: "The study I didn't
have will make my boy an important guy. He already went to
places I have never been to, like Jandfus in the state of
Rio Grande do Norte because of the escambo."29
The elected commission of teachers in Redonda's school
exemplifies how the community introduces new approaches to
solve difficult management situations. Parents and teachers
expressed dissatisfaction to the principal until she
resigned. After a brief period with a substitute, they
petitioned to the Secretary of Education for a tentative
solution in which the school would be directed by the
commission of five teachers. The experiment worked so well
that was permanently adopted in Redonda.
Hunger during droughts, and rough periods in
agriculture or fishing also causes poor children to evade
school because they become weak and sick due to
malnutrition. The knowledge about causes of the school
evasion depends on a broader understanding of the
socioeconomic and cultural context in which the phenomenon
is happening. The provision of school lunches with whatever
29 Escambo means a competitive presentation of various street theater groups that started in towns
administered by the Workers' Party.
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food came from state or federal agencies helped reduced the
incidence of high school drop-outs rates and flunking.30
Figures have not been collected to verify the effectiveness
of this assistance, but information from teachers and
administrators strongly suggest that school lunch program
has greatly decreased the drop-out rates of young children.
Health Care Achieveents
Achievements in the health sector in the three
municipios also stood out compared to most of the municipios
in Cear&. Interestingly, their governments took two
different approaches.
Icapui stressed prevention and health education and
relied heavily on health workers. This approach meant
health care could be distributed evenly throughout the
municipio while keeping it cost effective. Horizonte and
Croat& opted for a more conventional approach.
Icapul's rate of 50 deaths per 1,000 living births is
lower than Cear~'s rate of 70\1,000, and the national
average of 61\1,000 in 1991. With the program of monitoring
child from birth to six years Icapul's infant mortality fell
by 50%. The decline between 1991 and 1992 is even more
impressive because it refers to a crisis period. High
infant mortality rates usually happen during the critical
"paradeiro" (the lobster reproduction season when capturing
30 In Icapuf high incidence of school evasion happens during bad fishing seasons in Requenguela and
Barreiras. Similarly, Croate's districts of Santa Tereza and Olhos D'Agua experience the same as
Icapuf because of bad harvests. Considering that the national average of flunking just in the first
grade is above 50X, and the forecast for the year 2,000 is that 90X of the whole population will
have ess than four years of schooling any effort to reduce it is worthwhile.
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lobster is forbidden), when family incomes decrease, milk is
watered down, and malnutrition, diseases and diarrhea rise
in neighborhoods such as Redonda, Peroba, and Retiro Grande.
Despite this seasonal increase in infant mortality, the
municipal Health Department controlled its causes and
targeted worse areas for more assistance. Here are some
steps the local government took to increase health care:
1) The municipal Health Department assured that a
pediatrician, a general physician or a nurse visited the
poorest neighborhoods daily, and health posts were put in
walking distance of every neighborhood. The Health
Department had to fulfill the goals of universal access to
health care before massively investing in complex health
units. Thus the idea of local systems of health "SILOS" was
fully carried out in Icapui.31 This idea came from The
Eight National Conference of Health of 1985, attended by
medical students that later came to work in the town.32
2) Monitoring children from the prenatal stage through
the age of six has permitted the identification of diseases
and led to their effective treatment since 1990.
Pediatricians fill detailed information about each child's
health. Health agents measure and weigh children monthly
and register their growth in each child's chart.33 "Even if
31 It only had at the time of the first municipal government a L-type of health unit of the SESP
foundation, with four offices and a small dispensary.
32 See Chapter Three.
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it storms or the sun burns," said a health worker, "children
get what they need." Another one said "I do my duty either
by foot, by bike, or by 'jegue'."3
3) The coverage of all vaccines for avoidable diseases
(tetanus, diphtheria, measles, mumps, etc.) became routine
not only in Icapul, but also in Horizonte and Croat&.
Indeed, small pox and TB (tuberculosis) had already been
eradicated before 1986, and Polio has been under control
ever since.
In contrast to Icapul, Horizonte and Croat& established
their health systems with a stronger curative emphasis,
giving priority to the building of a hospital and hiring
doctors. Yet, they incorporated some of Icapui's
experience, such as adopting regular campaigns to increase
immunization against avoidable diseases.
In spite of different priorities within the health
sector for each of these three municipios, they all apply
more than 20% of their revenue to health services, in
contrast to most others that roughly apply the
constitutional 10%. For instance since 1989, Icapul has
been investing a monthly average of 23% of its total revenue
in health. Croat& and Horizonte complement their own
revenue using federal resources from the Unified Health
System funds (SUS) because having hospitals they are
33 Child's Health Chart. (Caderneta de Sade da Crianoa. Prefeitura Municipal de Icapuf. Com o Povo
Rumo ao Novo. Secretaria Municipal de Sade PtbLica e Saneamento. Secretaria de Sarde do Estado.
Projeto Nordeste).
34 A small donkey that is fit for the arid conditions of the Northeast Brazil.
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eligible to receive from the Hospital Internment Sys em
(SIH). Icapul at the time of the research was yet finishing
its hospital.
All three municipios use resources from the State
Health Department to hire and train health workers. They
also recruit professionals using medical networks. For
instance, contacts with the universities in Fortaleza
periodically bring senior students of dentistry, nursing or
medicine to work one month free as interns in the Health
Department of these towns.35
In sum, irrespective of which approach--preventive or
curative--these municipios used, all three improved their
health conditions more than the state average. The infant
mortality in the state fell one third from 1986 to 1989, the
rate of immunization increased 40%, and the 1992 measles
epidemic killed 700% fewer children than the previous
epidemics.36 The impressive drop in infant mortality all
over Cear& shows the progress in primary health care
supported by the state government.37 The collaboration
between Icapul, Croatf, and Horizonte tne state department
of health resulted in their superior sanitary conditions
35 CRUTAC internship is a program similar to the "Rondon Project." The program provides a first
contact with rural areas, and shows to students the conditions of work in the interior. It prepares
students for taking their practices outside the school.
36 Jornal do Brasil, 11/12/92. UNICEF praises Cear6's health programs.
37 See Freedheim 1993.
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compared with bordering municipalities, as shown during the
cholera epidemics of 1992.38
These three municipios dealt with the crisis by doing
simple things such as distributing small bottles of chlorine
to every family. Health agents, nurses, and social workers
taught community residents how to mix a few drops of
chlorine with water, letting it rest half an hour before
cooking or drinking.39 The distribution of water filters,
the treatment of water reservoirs with chlorine, teaching
basic notions of hygiene, and assuring regular medical
assistance in health posts and hospitals made the whole
difference.
The health agents were supposed to do that throughout
the state, but the task is more difficult when the
proportion of health agents to the population is
insufficient to reach all the families in the municipios.
The averages are 0.10% for Cear&, 0.23% for Icapui, 0.21%
for Croat&, and 0.06% for Horizonte. Although Horizonte
obtained good health results they derive more on the
investments made in the health sector and on the high wages
paid to health professionals than to the health agent.;'
program, which scores below the state average. Despite all
investments in the health sector the program (PAS) does not
work there as it should because the municipio does not hire
38 See in Introduction recent figures on the cholera epidemics.
39 This measure proved effective even in the districts where water conditions were the worst, e.g.,
most far away districts lack running water, and the process of carrying water from wells and pubtic
faucets easily contaminates it.
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a nurse to coordinate it. That should be Horizonte's
counter part to the state program. 40
All these municipios achieved remarkable success such
as 100% in school enrollment and immunization rates. Both
health care and education became accessible in areas not
formerly served. Where did they get the funding to do all
this? In Chapter Two I will show how decentralization and
funding allowed this success to occur.
40 The Secretary of Health, who is a nurse, accumulates the functions of coordinator of the program
with those of the Head of the Department of Health. The health supervisors in Fortaleza think this
reflects a lack of the local goverrnment support to the program. They argue that although spendin a
lot with wages, building a good municipal hospital, the administration does not spend any money with
the program. Therefore the quality of the agents' work proved better in places where the commitment
of the government to the program is demonstrated by a greater proportion of health agents to the
total population.
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CHAPTER TWO
Municipal Autonomy and Fiscal Changes
Looking at municipal government, funding is a major
constraint. I will describe in this chapter how Icapui,
Croat&, and Horizonte by using their municipal autonomy more
effectively than other municipios managed to improve all
their public services. They also were best at staying
within their municipal budgets despite current fiscally
stringed limits of the national economy. This finding
contradicts most local politicians in Brazil, who argue that
municipal budget is never sufficient to support good
government. How could they perform well in a fiscally
stringed context?
Icapui, CroatA, and Horizonte governments found
interesting solutions for increasing and maximizing their
revenue within the legal advances brought by the recent
municipal autonomy. The new Brazilian Constitution granted
to the states and municipios a greater share of the federal
tax revenues.41 Since 1988, there has been a legal mandate
for municipios to spend 25% of their revenue in education,
and 10% on health.42 Yet most of them disregard this
41 In 1988 the National Constitutional Assembly promulgated the new Constitution of Brazil. In
1989, the State Legislative Assemblies passed states' Constitutions; and in 1990, each municfpio had
its Organic Law approved by the local legislative body--Cimara de Vereadores. The Brazilian
Constitution recomends the use of participatory mechanisms in public administration.
42 See Afonso & Resende (1988), Afonso (1989).
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constitutional rule, and divert these percentages for other
purposes.
Prior to these changes, the excessive centralization of
the federal government imposed constraints for states and
municipios to fund their basic responsibilities. Because
the distribution of resources was so centralized, all sorts
of irregularities were possible while transferring money
through the various bureaucratized layers. Disbursements
depended on the power relations between the local and
central governments at the moment of the transaction. For
example, an ex-mayor reported that a road would only be
financed if it benefited the farm of a prestigious
landowner, politically connected with the federal agency.
"The colonel had the means to make the process go." Another
mayor said that "The resources to build a dam depended on
the will of the politicians at the State Legislative
Assembly. They often pledged a job for someone related to
the head of the agency financing the dam; otherwise, the
forms requesting the money would be kept endlessly in the
drawer of a bureaucrat's desk."
The lack of autonomy undermined the municipios' ability
to conceive long-range plans. Usually federal agencies
transferred resources directly to their state or municipal
counterparts. For example, for the local government to
build low income housing, the municipal department of social
development would have to deal directly with the federal
agency under the National Housing Bank (BNH). The secretary
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would have to fill many forms to contract the debt, which
would go to various departments and sections before the
money could reach its end. By that time, it no longer would
be sufficient to cover for the whole project. Inflation
also eroded resources during this interminable process.43
Changes in the fiscal structure assured the minimum
amount needed for municipios' basic operation through
regular transfers of money from the federal and state
governments to the municipios. With this tax reform, the
Municipal Participation Fund (FPM) became the main source of
municipal revenue.
TABLE 4 PARCELS OF THE FEDERAL INCOME REVENUE, AND
INDUSTRIALIZED PRODUCTS' TAX COMPULSORILY
TRANSFERRED TO THE PARTICIPATION FUND OF
MUNICIPALITIES AND STATES
YEAR FPM FPE"
1988* 17.0% 14.0%
1988 20.0% 18.0%
1989 20.5% 19.0%
1990 21.0% 19.5%
1991 21.5% 20.0%
1992 22.0% 20.5%
1993 22.5% 21.5%
Source: MINISTtRIO DA ECONONIA, FAZENDA E PLANEJANENTO, 1991.
(PLANNING, ECONOMY, AND FINANCE MINISTRY)
* Before 10/04/88
The FPM is a formulae-based compulsory transfer of tax
revenue from the federal government, which distributes to
43 Monthly inflation rates in Brazil stay approximately around 30X.
44 The main source of state revenue comes from the State Participation Fund (FPE), a formula, sed
transfer from the federal government. The state also shares with its municfpios the Commercia. nd
Services Taxes (ICMS).
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municipios a share proportional to their population and
inversely to per capita income. In 1966, the 10% of Federal
Income Tax (IR) and Industrialized Products Tax (IPI) went
to FPM. The share municipios received had been increasing
since 1988, from 17% to 22.5% in 1993, when it stabilized.
The local administrators' capacity to mobilize
resources is a major indicator of their success (Olowu &
Smoke, 1992).45 Although the opportunity to get extra funds
is open to all municipios, just a few pursue it because they
usually do not have impressive achievements to back them up
in their requests. There is still untapped revenue
potential in most municipios and local taxes can be more
widely used to generate more municipal income.46 Successful
municipios like Croat&, Icapul, and Horizonte stopped
neglecting these other sources, such as property and service
taxes, but yet, the FPM share remains their main revenue.
In contrast to most small municipios that do not yet
collect their taxes, Icapui has taken advantage of some of
these potential sources and ICMS has replaced oil royalties
as its largest revenue generator.47 Icapul ranks in the
19th place in ICM collection in the whole state. Horizonte
increased its own sources investing massively in industry
45 See Olowu & Smoke (1992), Shah (1991).
46 The municipal revenue in the country has more than doubled since 1985; in 1990 it was 5.2% of
GNP. Municipal revenue amounted to 17% of the share in total revenue of Brazil in the same year.
Only 1% of this 5.2% was generated by municfpios' own sources.
47 Icapuf has the biggest oil basin in Ceari, and royalties contribute monthly with an average of
10% of the municipal revenue.
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because its privileged location near Fortaleza permits the
use of its urban population and fiscal incentives of the
semi-arid region.4 Croat& still relies mostly on
intergovernmental transfers as source of revenue because the
receipts accruing from agriculture began recently with
intensive vegetable gardening. Only in 1992 CroatA started
charging local taxes.
Increasingly demand for services created new incentives
to collect local taxes. The decision to collect the
property tax (IPTU), usually has political and
administrative costs most mayors fear are higher than
benefits.49 Therefore, governments needed legitimacy to
enforce property taxes' assessment and collection properly
without eliciting great resistance. The better performing
municipios which had proven themselves were able to tax
property, services and other sources to increase their
municipal revenue. As examples, Icapui and Horizonte are
already collecting IPTU. Croat& finished in 1991 its first
properties' directory, and recently started charging IPTU,
revealing the same decision of developing its tax
administration capacity. Since 1988, Brazilian municipios
have increased their tax collection by an average of 109%.50
48Among the three municfpios Horizonte has the highest urban percent (see table 1).
49 See Dillinger (1989). Beyond the collection of Urban (IPTU) and Rural Property Taxes (ITR),
municfpios should charge for services (ISS), tax on property sales (ITBI), tax motor vehicles
registration (IPVA), and fuel tax IWCLG).
50 Veja No. 40 (1992).
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The fiscal changes after 1985 have been criticized by
some economists who claim that municipal autonomy will lead
to parochialism and corruption, and that the federal
government will be deprived of substantial revenue to
operate properly. But, standardized procedures of
disbursement after 1988 gave clarity to the process of
getting money, and spared mayors and secretaries the strain
of being solely responsibly for carrying resources to their
jobs. This compulsory flow of resources gave the necessary
stability for continuous operation of services, which
enhanced further administrative innovations in progressive
municipios.
Funding Innovations in Public Management
The mayors of Icapul, Croat&, and Horizonte by showing
great improvements in their priority sectors got additional
federal and state resources to improve education and health.
This helped them build accountability to constituencies, to
the state government, and to the public. Awards from the
state, or specific projects negotiated with UNICEF and other
international agencies like GTZ (contacted in Germany
through the Catholic Church) complement their municipal
budgets. Although these extra-sources of revenue are
intermittent, they significantly add to the minimum 10% set
for health, and the 25% for education.
They did not use the money like most other towns with
the local top bureaucracy, (no expensive cars, no luxurious
public buildings, headquarters, or offices to serve the
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mayor and secretaries). Instead they have put at least an
extra 10% into areas such as teacher training. For example,
Icapul used the money to install a modest, yet efficient
health system; to give subsided housing, food, or
transportation for teachers from neighboring towns to come
and work in its schools; or paying for students to compete
in other towns' contests.51 Horizonte has a project for
recycling educational material in its elementary schools
funded by UNICEF. Before I left, UNICEF was also
negotiating an educational project with Croat&.
Gains from public recognition - During 1991 National
Measles' Campaign, Cear& government gave another prize to
Icapul for the highest rate of inoculations in the state
(100% compared to an average of 90% in others). This award
exemplifies both the effect of public recogntion and how it
innovated health management. IcapuT used this cash-prize to
buy a computer to compile socioeconomic and health data.
The local government considered the information about its
population's health status essential for planning and
operating an efficient health system. Knowing the standard
of living, economic conditions, the need for sanitation, the
size and material of houses helped the Health Department to
devise appropriate measures of primary health care to fight
common diseases and morbidity. It could evaluate which
51 The ocal goverrment installed itself in an old small house, after being temporarily in a school
room waiting for the money to come from the state in the beginning of 1986. Since then, it kept a
modest pattern of installation, with 400 employees (3X of total population), although the public
sector is a major employer in the municfpio. 60X of the aunicipal budget goes to wages and
expenditures with personnel, training, transportation, subsiding housing and related matters.
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districts demanded more assistance, which groups had
frequent work-related illnesses to be treated, which
preventive health care was recommended for each community.
Since the UNICEF award (see page 19), Icapui has attracted
attention, appearing in VEJA (the largest selling weekly
news read all over Brazil) as among the best administered
cities in the whole country.52 This award also helped the
local government gain the confidence of inhabitants, and
induce them to participate in the collective planning of the
governmental actions. The increasingly popular involvement
in planning the allocation of resources distinguished Icapul
administration from convential local governments.
Furthermore, outside recognition eased the state
government's boycott to its initiatives on the grounds of
political party differences, (see Chapter Three). Croat& also
gained notoriety when an educational TV program presented
the results of its school calendar adaptation. Newspapers
in Fortaleza advertised Horizonte's public contest and
highest wages in Cear& for specialized personnel.
Another way of carrying more resources to these towns
was through extracurricular activities and joint educational
programs with federal and state agencies, such as the
Brazilian Center for Child and Youth Assistance Foundation
(FCBIA), the CearA Society for Culture and Environmental
Protection (SOCEMA), and UNICEF. One example is the course
52 Horizonte and Croath were also briefly mentioned in Veja's article.
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on environment protection in Icapui, which taught children
to preserve local mangroves and sand dunes as habitat of
perishing species. The Ministry of Education, the Students'
Assistance Foundation (FAE), and the Educational Foundation
(EDUCAR) also financed other initiatives.
Another change in policy which supports fiscal
responsibility is the direct negotiation of projects with
the donor agencies. As local governments' decentralization
progressed, these functions previously restricted to the
mayor or to the secretary of each municipal department were
delegated to the heads of local associations. For example,
presidents of neighborhood associations or community
organizations in Icapul frequently negotiate the financing
of their projects directly with the agencies. The municipal
department of the respective area in which the project will
be developed assist them, but the money goes directly to the
association, instead of going first to the administration.
This procedure avoids bureaucratic delays. The emerging
interaction among associations' local boards and the public
sector improves local policies benefiting both private and
public sectors.
Most local governments still depend a lot on negotiated
intergovernmental transfers to finance their services.
Thus, the gained autonomy does not completely exclude
bargaining from the mayor's agenda. Mayors and municipal
secretaries still need outside sources of revenue to provide
health, education and other services to their constituents.
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But what is important about the intergovernmental transfers
is that they gained clear criteria of operation, and became
part of the municipal budget. Their predictability made
them less dependent on "under the table" arrangements of
politicians and bureaucrats. For example, when a municipal
department receives money to build a school or a hospital,
the secretary need to be accountable not only to the state
or to the federal agency that is financing the work, but
also to the mayor and to the constituencies as well.
Local governments had difficulty in the municipalizing
services because they lacked managerial and technical
expertise. It took them a while to overcome constraints
like the conditions imposed by INAMPS to release resources.
These conditions require the calculation of the amount to be
released be based on the number of the total population, of
health professionals and on the capacity of the health
equipment installed in the municipio. The Unified Health
System (SUS)53 imposes a limit to release the payments for
the Ambulatory Information System (SIA) and Hospital
Internment System (SIH) bills.
Small cities rarely meet these requirements, so, they
seldom receive the full amount they should be entitled. For
instance, Croat&'s allowance for dental service covers each
inhabitant going to the dentist once a year. Croat& does
not receive the 14,823 dental appointments it should because
53 SUS was created by Law 8080 of 1990 to replace SUDS (Decree Law 94657 of 1987)
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it has a limited number of dentists, and this cut down the
SUS resources intended for dental service. Then, the city
is not eligible to receive the full amount it needs. A
vicious cycle led to a general deficiency of the health
sector because the system underpaid for service provided,
and did not satisfy demand, e.g., it only pays dentists a
maximun of three patients an hour even if they see more.
However, once Croat&'s administration dealt with this
problem by using funds from the municipal budget to hire two
part-time dentists the municipio was able to qualify for an
increase in the SUS resources.
Decentralization in Different Styles of Governments
The explanation for the success of these three
municipios local governments is usually attributed to the
argument of decentralization. One could think that
decentralization alone explains it. But, not all municipios
that have decentralized worked equally well. In fact, even
the municipios that have worked well have used diverse
styles of government. Icapul advanced more than the other
two, in the sense that decisions were shared by the
municipal government agencies with the organizations
representing the civil society. For example, collective
demands have priority over individual demands. This
practice discourages clientelistic behavior because although
the government is constantly open to hear anyone from the
population, negotiations always involve more interlocutors
than just authority-demander (see Chapter Three).
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Most politicians resist decentralization because they
lose power from not having any grants to mediate with the
central government. These politicians, and some specialists
in public management claim that decentralization does not
lead to the intended universalism in the provision of public
services. Some local politicians realized that improved
services after decentralization give them the popularity
needed for good electoral performance.
One example of how Icapul's administration reformed
finance was the way it budgeted education and health. The
task was not an easy one, but it was possible because of
pre-existing neighborhood associations, which were stronger
and older than in Croat& and Horizonte. The administration
found support in these associations to organize "self-help
collective efforts" to build schools and health posts. The
capacity of tapping into existing community initiatives ct
costs of providing the services needed. Instead of
providing everything the public sector recognized and gave
prestige to long standing community groups to cooperate with
the administration.
The process works as follows. Representatives of
neighborhood associations and other organizations deliberate
with city councilmen, secretaries and with the mayor about
the government plan and its budget. Many local meetings in
all communities discuss which demands should be presented in
global meetings that lead to the formulation of the budget.
There are also meetings to evaluate the progress of the
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local government actions taken during the year. Revenues
and expenditures are checked monthly. There is even an
innovative way of presenting the balance, it is printed on
the wall of the mayor's house for every citizen to go over
the numbers.
In contrast to Icapul, financial decisions in Horizonte
are much more centralized. Yet, Horizonte's administration
succeeded despite less participation. Instead of a broad
number of associations taking part in the elaboration of the
municipal budget, a group of friends and relatives helped
the mayor to define the government plan. The mayor chose a
nurse, who is also his sister, to be the secretary of
health. What one would expect from these kin and cronies
appointments? The mayor avoided opposition by working
closely with the president of the Rural Worker's Union,
chosen by him as the secretary of agriculture. Yet, he
carried out a public contest to hire public employees, and
the city became known for having the highest health salaries
of Cear&.54 This fact of paying good wages is crucial to
secure professionals in the interior, otherwise they migrate
to bigger cities, where they have better opportunities.55
54 Dihrio do Nordeste Fortaleza, CE. Quinta-feira, 25 de Junho de 1992.
55 Despite the investments made in the health sector, and the high wages paid to health
professionals, the health agents' program is not working well there. The health supervisors in
Fortaleza think that the program acks support from the local goverrnent. One evidence of that is
that the secretary of health accumulates the function of coordinator of the program. Although
spending a lot with wages, the unicfpio did not hire a nurse to coordinate the program. To have a
nurse as coordinator is essential to a smoothly running health agent program. Without a nurse this
job goes to the Secretary of Health. So the absence of a nurse, and the busy schedule of the health
secretariat, leaves the secretary of health with no time for ths program, end the program remains
neglected. People in Horizonte see the great potential of the health agents' program, but they feel
that it lacks the mayor's support. In order for this program to be succesful it must be taken
seriously into the government agenda.
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Nevertheless less participatory characteristics Horizonte's
government improved health and education sectors.
Croat&'s mayor works in the most individual fashion.
He is a successful tomato farmer who went to college in
Fortaleza before returning to his hometown. He was elected
in 1988, and took office in January of 1989. Opinion-
polls acknowledge his good government. People do not see
corruption going on in Croat&, though the mayor's wife is
the secretary of finance, and his sister-in-law administers
the hospital. Although the mayor chose his kin to occupy
top positions--keeping him informed about what was being
spent in the municipio--he also promoted public contests to
hire public employees. Even while his wife controlled the
municfpios' finances, he gave relative autonomy to the
secretaries, letting them decide about appropriate policies
for their areas. Later on, the mayor chose other
secretaries based on professional competency to neutralize
for appointing immediate collaborators within friends, and
family. He advertised open positions for physicians in the
capital's newspapers. He knew that to attract good
professionals to a distant place, such as Croat&, the only
way was seducing them with high salaries (calculated in
dollars).
The mayor recognized that education and health sectors
were crucial to promote the necessary changes in the
municipio. He trusted the people he chose to take care of
the sectors. The secretaries of health and education got
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their jobs, even without being friends or relatives. Their
competence was the main criterion for the choices, because
the mayor intended to replicate in Croat& the efficiency
they had led in other places. The experienced educator he
brought had an outstanding familiarity with rural education.
The secretary had participated in educational radio programs
for people of the country side, and had developed programs
of adult literacy. The mayor invited him to be his
secretary of education, although they were from different
political parties.
The first secretary of health in Croat& did not satisfy
the mayor, therefore, using the competence criteria as in
education, he chose another secretary. The new secretary
came from a neighboring town where he had done a good job as
secretary of health. He structured the health system very
much inspired in Icapul, emphasizing primary health care.
The health agents' program started in the municipio, and the
number of health units increased. The secretaries of both
health and education departments launched joint programs.
They went to each locality of the municipio, giving talks at
schools' and neighborhood associations' meetings, conducting
discussions about major educational and health problem.
Observing all this finding it became clear that
autonomy alone was not sufficient to enable them to perform
so well. The process of emancipation, the dissemination of
innovative measures, and a new orientation in public policy
will be discussed in Chapter Three.
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CHAPTER THREE
Reasons for Good Public Sector Performance
Icapui, Croatd, and Horizonte had been among districts
which longed for independence because their former municipal
seats had prevented their development. In response to the
increasing tension between neglected districts and their
municipal seats, the state government conducted a referendum
in each of the contentious areas. Based on those results
Cear& created 27 new municipios between 1984 and 1991
wherever local people gathered enough support for
emancipation. The new municipios also needed to meet other
criteria for emancipation. They had to sustain themselves,
organize their staff, establish their tax assessments and
collection processes, build sufficient authority over their
responsibilities and funds to hold their independence.
In this chapter I discuss how the struggle to become
new municipios affected Icapul, Croat&, and Horizonte, and
why it improved the governments' performance. The three
municipios won their emancipation almost simultaneously,
through similar processes. I present Icapui as the leading
case to describe the importance of emancipation for future
developments, contrasting it briefly with Croat& and
Horizonte. I analyze how the struggle created pressure on
the new leaders to perform well; how it enhanced
participatory mechanisms and innovations in their public
administration; and how professional, kinship, and political
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party ties are important for disseminating succesful
experiences.
The Emancipation Struggle
The municipio of Icapul has 406 square kilometers in
the eastern shore line of Cear&.56 It pertained to the
municipio of Aracati, one of the oldest and more important
in the state. Since 1938, inhabitants of the area had
attempted to begin a new municipio. At that time, the name
of this district of Aracati was Ca£garas, but in 1942, the
administrative reorganization of Cear& had it renamed as
Icapu. 57 In 1951, the state created another district in
Aracati named Manibd, which became part of the new unit,
when in 1985, the state finally installed the municipio of
Icapuf. 58
The movement toward emancipation gained momentum in
late 1950s, with the leadership of a priest, Padre Abilio;
and in late 1970s and early 1980s, when another priest,
Padre Diomedes and new leaders joined the struggle. In
1958, Cear&'s Legislative Assembly agreed that Icapul could
56 Icapuf people insist--as some historians' assert--that the first navigator to come to Brazil was
not Pedro ALvares Cabral, who came to Bahia in 1500. They believe that at the end of the Fifteenth
Century, Vincent Pizon came to Ponta Grossa, one of Icapuf's shores, and met Trememb Indians.
After 1500, the Portuguese occupied the lands of the native Trememb6, followed by the Dutch in 1658.
Finally, later settlers from the Semi-arid interior--"sertho people"--started fishing along the
municfpio's shores, and colonized the area. Then, evolved the communities of Ponta Grossa, Retiro
Grande, Redonda, Peroba, Barreiras, Barrinha de Mutamba, Requenguela, Peixe Gordo, Melancias,
Trememb6, Quit6rias, Belem, Serra de Cajuais, Cajuais, Serra de Mutamba, Mutamba, Ibicuitaba, Morro
Pintado, Berimbiu, and Icapuf.
57 Icapuf is the nickname for the native Trememb6 word igarapui, which means a small and fast canoe
with the form of a needle. Trememb was the Indian tribe that lived there before the Portuguese
arrival. The change of names (decree number 1114) occurred because there was another place in the
state with the same name.
58 Decree 1153.
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become a new municipio. Yet, in a strategic counter-move,
the local oligarchy of Aracati (led by "colonels" of the
powerful Costa Lima family) delayed the act's publication in
the Cear&'s Official Diary until January of 1959. They held
up the whole process in order to prevent their members from
losing prominence in the state and in the federal
governments. Once the municipio was split, the current
officials would lose constituents (approximately 20%) and
political power. Consequently, they kept postponing the
installation of the new municipio. Although the supporters
were ready for emancipation since 1958 the process depended
on the next scheduled elections. Unfortunately, prior to
the election a military coup in 1964 stopped the process for
27 years (from 1958 until 1985).
The "praianos"--people from Icapui--blamed Aracati
politicians for Icapui's backwardness, and continued to push
for independence. In 1980, Fortaleza University students
from Icapul created the Cultural Association of Icapui
(ACICA). A larger association appeared in 1981, the Aracati
University Students Association (AEUA). Both associations
had significant roles in the struggle for emancipation.
ACICA nominated a student leader to be candidate to the
Aracati City Council. Although the candidate faced strong
opposition in Aracati, he was elected one of the city
councilors in 1982.59 He defended Icapui emancipation
59 He won an impressive third place out of approximately 20 candidates. Icapuf held 20% of Aracatt
voters.
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against most of the Aracatf members in the council meetings.
Later, when Icapul finally became a municipio, the ex-
student leader became its first elected mayor, supported by
the members of ACICA, and by "praianos" interested in
independence.
The process of emancipation required, among other
things, a referendum to verify if the inhabitants really
wanted independence. Political leaders in Aracati
campaigned against it, counter-arguing that separation at
that point would ruin Icapui's chances for development.
They said it was necessary to wait a little longer, maybe
two or three years more, until it had sufficient economic
strength to be independent. Although emancipators defeated
their opponents by two-thirds of the votes, they were
disappointed by what they considered a small difference--as
they had expected unanimous results in the referendum.60
Finally emancipation was granted in 1985. As one third of
the population dissented against it and the legal and
financial requirements to remain independent depended on
efficiency, the new leaders were under tremendous pressure
to perform well and to win people's support.61
The same history of long dependence linking former
districts to their municipios' seats, as with Icapul and
60 Icapuf had the smallest difference in the results among the 10 municfpios hich Cear& emancipated
that year: 59% of the inhabitants (1223) voted yes and 41% voted against emancipation (841).
61 The Brazilian Constitution Art. 18, fourth establishes the conditions for emancipation and
fusion of municfpios, leaving to the states more specific regulations.
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Aracati, also happened between Croat&62 and Guaraciaba do
Norte, and between Horizonte and Pacajds. A local teacher
said: "'Guaraciabenses' treated 'Croatenses' as if they were
'illiterate savages': 'Indians' whom they could deprecate
and exploit." Croat& reacted against Guaraciaba do Norte
and became a new municipio in 1988, with four districts:
Barra do Sotero, Betania, Santa Tereza and S&o Roque.63
Horizonte reacted the same way to become independent from
Pacajus, and got its emancipation in 1987 with the districts
of Aningas, Dourado, and Queimados.64 As in Icapui the
struggle for independence created both the enthusiasm for
reform, the determination to show tangible and quick
progress and pressure to perform in an accountable way
unlike the clientelism and exploitation of the past, as I
show bellow.
Roots of Participation
I will discuss in this section how the emancipation
struggle built popular support for the change in attitude
and performance of local governments. These cases exemplify
a process with delayed effects,65 making institutional
62 Croati is the name of a very common plant in the "carrasco" of the Ibiapaba region of Cear&.
63 The creation of all them were respectively published in The Official Diary of the state under the
decrees n. 11430 of 1988, n. 6529 of 1963, decree n.11206 of 1986, decree n.004 of 1989. Croat& had
7,002 voters among a population of 14,492 inhabitants, in 1990.
64 Decree number 11 300, and its districts were created at the same time. During the 1990 elections
it had 9,559 voters among a population of 18,262 inhabitants, in 1990.
65 See Salamon (1979) for these delayed effects and how they interfere in future outcomes
of projects, usually not considered in follow up evaluations.
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innovations feasible.6 The emotions evoked by experiencing
a common history set the basis among town citizens for a
sense of belonging, and for the will to develop and preserve
their place.67 In Icapul, the strong sentiment of identity
felt by "praianos" can be seen in the following example:
UNICEF conducted research among school children in coastal
towns of Cear& before awarding its Education Prize. In
contrast to what researchers found in other towns, children
were very proud of Icapul. Children liked their home town
and did not want to go to S&o Paulo to pursue a better life
when they grew up. Inhabitants had transferred to their
children the belief in Icapui's economic prospects,
connected to this feeling of belonging. They felt they had
a responsibility to improve their town.
The mobilization which aimed to free districts from
their previous municipios had some positive side-effects,
which arose later and lasted longer than the struggle for
emancipation itself. Sleeper effects emerged in municipios
like Icapu£, where the popular mobilization movement had
been the strongest. Inhabitants from different social
backgrounds--landowners, business people, small farmers,
fishers, and landless workers--fought as allies against a
common enemy: their previous municipal seat politicians.6
66 Putman (1992) also stresses the importance of history and tradition to understand some civic
characteristics that appear in different outcomes of ItaLy's regional governments. His approach
helps to see how the process of emancipation had its seeper effects in quite shorter time (five
years) than in the cases discussed by the two authors.
67 See Barth (1969), BrandAo (1986), Cardoso de Oiveira (1976), Goffman (1961, 1975), Tuan,
(1974) Zarur (1991).
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After struggling for municipal autonomy, all these
people who otherwise had no social, political, or class
affinity became committed to develop their towns together.
The crucial threat of going back to the previous status of
dependent districts haunted the new municipios after
emancipation.69 A return to the former municipio would be a
loss of face for the new mayors, and a big frustration for
all who participated in the struggle. Once the struggle had
brought people together, the fear of failing economically
sustained these alliances longer than expected. This threat
pressured mayors and administrators to show quick results
such as better provision of schools, more teachers, more
doctors and nurses, better roads, and water sources.
Consequently, municipal administrators needed accountability
to remain legitimate in the minds of both the state
government and their local constituencies.
While fighting for emancipation, people had learned
that "the right amount of pressure at the right time" could
obtain the desired results from the state government.
During the struggle, they depended upon information about
the state government's decisions to react either by
influencing sympathetic state representatives, or by other
forms of protest. They marched in the streets, participated
in hunger-strikes, and collected signatures on petitions to
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68 See Tendler (1980), Zarur (1991) for comparable examples of situations of tension that bring
people from different backgrounds together to face a common problem.
69 I could not find any case of this threat being put in operation.
pressure government into providing housing, education, and
health services. Therefore, they changed from simply
protesting against neglect into more participatory behavior.
People from each locality used informal meetings to discuss
issues before presenting their claims for improvements
formally to the municipal government. Information was as
essential for fast and strong reactions against unwanted
solutions concerning their communities, as it had been for
getting the emancipation.
The government of Icapul benefited more than the others
from its long emancipation process because it taught
residents and public employees to collaborate with each
other. Social workers of the Health and Social Development
Departments organized weekly talks in each community to list
demands, and to discuss possible solutions. They also gave
assistance to local associations. Social workers helped
residents to elaborate projects for funding agencies, and to
fill in forms for the appropriate donor agencies. Residents
realized that things could work faster if they cooperate
with the government. For example, when the government
provided material and land, they willingly used their time
to build the houses, health posts, and schools. Residents
learned to make demands and press for what they wanted; they
also understood better the importance of demanding
accountability from their leaders.
The emancipation struggle had also taught government
leaders to enhance residents' organizational skills so that
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they could participate in the administration. In Icapui,
for example, the administration suggested health policies to
be discussed in the local health committees. The nurses and
social workers of the Department of Health prepared visual
material to introduce the issue for discussion. They laid
out the proposition's main objectives, what it would
accomplish, and how people from the community could help.
The very process of bringing some issues to discussion
elicited new ways of thinking about possibilities of
implementing fewer costly measures.
Yet, the democratization trend alone does not explain
good municipal performance, neither does the emancipation
process. The unusual return of educated people to the town
is another interesting aspect about Icapui, which enhanced
participation. Usually, when people from small Brazilian
towns go away to study (these towns do not have colleges,
even high schools seldom exist), they stay in bigger cities
after receiving their degrees. In contrast, in Icapul the
mayor could chose his secretaries among his long time
supporters, former members of the students' movement in
Fortaleza. Sevanteen peers in the movement returned to
Icapul hoping to carry out a long range plan of developing
their town. These politicized ex-students returned to
Icapul as junior professionals committed to reform. They
were engineers, agronomists, dentists, teachers, historians,
economists, managers, physicians, nurses, social workers,
and a geologist. They occupied key positions in the local
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government: Communication, Planning, and Finance Assessors;
Heads of the Municipal Departments of Social and Economic
Development, of Education, of Health, of Work, of
Administration; School Principals, and City Councilors.
After long debates in many community meetings, this
idealist group of seventeen young professionals decided that
education and health would be the administration's top
priorities. They realized that they needed to target basic
services to break the hold of the previous system of
patronage. These sectors were fundamental to their goal of
real change. The fact that they would give public education
and medical assistance to everyone meant that the previous
structure of favors and dependence would disappear. This
broad access to services was the most significant step to
break with the traditional way of doing politics in the
interior.
Although the administration of Icapuf had this core
group of Fortaleza ex-students that had returned to lisa and
work in the interior, they were insufficient to fill all
necessary positions in the local government. Outsiders were
also incorporated and helped to make the government more
efficient. For example, a public health specialist from
Paraiba became the Municipal Secretary of Health because she
had connections with health professionals of this core group
through medical meetings in Fortaleza and Jo&o Pessoa.
Doctors, dentists, and nurses came from Fortaleza, because
they had studied with the people of Icapul, or knew about
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the work they were doing. This inclusion of outsiders with
few ties to old-style local politicians further sever limits
to the patronage system and helped the efficient delivery of
services without eliciting claims of loyalty to coopt the
new administration.
State Government versus Local Alliances
The first municipal election split some of the
alliances of people which had been formed during the
struggle for independence. After emancipation former allies
took different sides while campaigning for opposing
political parties. The electoral campaigns and the dispute
over political positions in the three new municipios
reflected diverging personal or economic interests; e.g., an
uncle and a nephew ran against each other as mayoral
candidates, and relatives competed to be appointed to
important positions in the local government. Conflict
appeared also when family members urged elected mayors or
city councillors to replicate traditional practices of
nepotism. Family ties and political loyalty in public and
private administrations usually are indicators of
inefficiency and corruption.
An interesting balance between the traditional and the
new way of doing politics while governing their towns
happened with the mayors of Croat& and Horizonte. (ee details in
Chapter Two) Although the mayors adopted innovations and
improved services in their towns, they also succumbed to
familiar pressures. So even using old nepotism oriented
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choices to appoint a few key positions, these mayors avoided
corruption in the government by adopting the criteria of
merit and competence to select all public personnel.
Furthermore they included participatory practices in the
management.
The fact that family members of the mayors of Horizonte
and Croat& took active part in the administration was a
counter intuitive finding because the presence of relatives
did not harm the credibility of these administrations.
Despite this seemingly old style politics, the local
administrations have performed efficiently neither incurring
in corruption nor in patronage in the eyes of their
constituencies.
The first mayor of Croat& previously had been a mayoral
candidate in Guaraciaba do Norte (Croat& former municipal
seat), in a rightist party called the Social Democratic
Party (PDS). Defeated, he changed to a more progressive
party--the Brazilian Social Democracy Party (PSDB). The
first mayor of Horizonte also won the elections as a PSDB
candidate, and took office in 1989. He had been director of
an important construction firm in Fortaleza, with no
previous electoral experience.70 The first mayors of
70 Horizonte poet Medeiros summarized strong feelings in this popular rime:
"An intelligent mayor does not despise his people ...
The voter who is cleaver voted for him because good voters do not sell their votes, and
Horizonte now has an educated and competent ruler ...
Searching for liberty he wa a pioneer ...
Horizonte believes in the talent of this young engineer"
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Horizonte and Croat& took office at the same time as
Icapu£'s second mayor.
Croat& and Horizonte mayors won the elections running
in the same party as the state government, the PSDB.
Therefore, both municipios got state support more easily
than Icapul, a PT administration. Although Croat& is far
from Fortaleza, the municipio is still able to influence
state government decisions favorably through political party
ties. Horizonte was privileged in this respect because, in
addition to using political ties, the mayor and the
secretaries could pressure state departments personally and
obtain faster release of money because of the proximity.
Recently, despite of being in the opposition, Icapul has
been receiving state support because of its striking work.
The striking work of Icapul is the result of a long
process. The campaign to choose the first mayor continued
to mobilize the same people grouped around the emancipation
struggle. The candidate of the Brazilian Democratic
Movement Party (PMDB)71 won, and took office in 1986. This
mayor had been the student leader, and the combative
councilor who had led the struggle for emancipation. As
mayor, he began making reforms, suppressing political
influences, setting up social investments, and advancing the
school and the health systems. These had been priorities
since the beginning of his political campaign as mayoral
71 Formery a leftist party, it became center, and now is pending to the right.
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candidate, as well as recurrent demands while he erved his
term as city councilor in Aracati.
Although he had run as a PMDB, the commitment of the
entire administration of Icapul to change the old-style
politics was an affront to the Cear& PMDB leadership. PMDB
members regarded Icapul's affiliates as radicals because
they aimed at drastic changes. It became apparent after
some time in office that the reformists lacked enough party
support to pass their initiatives.7 In consequence, all
members of the administration decided to change their party
affiliation from PMDB to PT--the Workers' Party. Many
respondents in my interviews pointed out: "PT is more
suitable than PMDB for governmental reforms." People think
this party has a more radical position in "favor of the
poor," and that "PT gives voters access to school, medical
care, and voice." The Workers' Party got reelected twice
and began in January 1993 its third consecutive term in
Icapul.
The fact that Icapul officially became a member of PT,
an opposition party, exacerbated its difficulties because
the state government was run by PMDB affiliates. Political
party divergences forced Icapul to assume sole
responsibility for primary education and basic health care--
a responsibility previously shared with the state
government. Party politics led to the premature
72 A local newspaper printed in highlights in July, 1987: State government does not care about the
road:"The governor is a step-father to Icapuf."'
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"municipalization" of basic services in Icapul. Since
education and health were shared responsibilities with the
state (discussed in Chapter Two), most municipios had
neither qualified personnel nor the necessary infrastructure
to provide such services. The newly emancipated were the
most deprived of all. In this case, the local government
had an additional source of pressure for good performance.
Despite all the constraints imposed by political
confrontation, the young leaders opposed the state
government to prove their ideals. It was a matter of local
pride.
In a way, beginning from scratch the experience of
installing a new municipio, with its inherent administrative
and judicial difficulties, had prepared the local government
to cope with the responsibilities of providing basic
services in education and health. Fortunately, Icapu£
managed to sustain some support from the state Department of
Education in spite of its political party conflicts.
The state Department of Education had an extremely
important role in providing training for teachers, both
locally, in neighboring towns, and in Fortaleza. State
training programs were available even to dissidents like
Icapul because the bureaucratic layers between the city and
the governor's office were not concerned with ongoing
political differences. The role of the state government is
rather complex because tasks (like training) continue to be
performed in a routine basis, despite major political
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disagreements between the state and the municipal
leadership. It goes beyond decentralization matters.
Assistance from state employees also solved some
managerial problems. The municipio received outside help to
do technical and even political tasks it could not do alone.
When the proper assistance within the public administration
framework fails, the mayor and secretaries looked for
support in the private sector or from NGOs. Icapui and
Horizonte, for instance, hired a consultant firm from
Fortaleza to do their accounting. They also used the
services of other consultants to help them in their various
presentations to get funding. Croat& did the same.
Another point concerning state-local relations refers
to the asymmetry of information during decentralization
(mentioned in Chapter Two), when the distribution of the
decision making power, responsibilities, and funds impeded
an even participation of all municipios. Two factors
affected distribution: distance and political alliances.
For instance, Croatd was very isolated because it is the
furthest distance away from the state capital (352 km),
about ten hours by bus. Icapul, at five hours (206 km)
distance should have gotten information faster than Croat&,
but slower than Horizonte the nearest of the three. To
offset distance Croat& has kept a strong bond with the state
government because both belong to the same political party.
Horizonte (40 km) is only one hour away from Fortaleza by
bus certainly has double advantage--same political party and
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the least distance. Horizonte draws resources faster than
Icapui because of its stronger political alliances.
However, greater distance (like Croat&) may be an advantage.
It provides autonomy to field-based bureaucrats or extension
agents, and gives them more freedom to act because
supervision by state employees may be weaker.73
Antagonistic relations among municipios and the state
government restricted the access to information and
resources, keeping mayors from intervening in state
government decisions. The crucial point in these cases
refers less to the distance itself, and more to which
mechanisms these municipios use to communicate well and to
get what they need. Political party ties do play a decisive
role in spreading information and giving support to the
mayors. The vantage of sharing the same party as the state
government is not sufficient to explain the success of
Horizonte and Croat&. Icapui, for instance, was able to
overcome the handicap of being opposition and get the state
support by performing exceptionally well.
In the next section I will present mechanisms of
protest and participation as essential channels for
democratic government. I will analyze why participation was
relevant for good government, using Icapul as the example.
Increased Popular Participation in Local Government
One of the reasons for local governments' success was
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73 See Lipsky, (1980).
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public participation. The new Constitution allowed citizens
to take part in the formulation of public policies. For
example, there are two legal provisions explicitly for
popular participation: a) representative associations taking
part in municipal planning, and b) the possibility of at
least 5% of the electorate to sign a proposal for a
legislation to pass in the city council. Participation
takes time out of other activities and requires democratic
practices unusual for most people.74 Participation also
brings the responsibility to comply with decisions taken
collectively. The simple presence of committees and -
councils involved in decision-making made actions difficult
to conceal.
Formal citizen participation in the government, for
example, became relevant in Icapui when combined with
reform-minded leadership. A wave of demonstrations that
took place in Icapul before and shortly after emancipation.
The biggest march for emancipation brought almost half of
the population to the streets in 1985. Mobilization
continued after emancipation, and in 1987 public servants
demanded on the streets the approval of the wage and career
plan proposed by the local government but opposed by some
city councillors. The mayor's plan passed and the
demonstration served to give him legitimacy in the eyes of
the "vereadores" and the town. Another manifestation
74 See Watson (1992) for a detailed description of how ocal sanitation agencies interacted mainly
with women because they had more time for meetings during office hours.
71
similarly buoyed up the city's second mayor. In 1989, a
defeated mayoral candidate took legal action to contest the
elections. People in the town say that he bribed a judge to
suspend his opponent's mandate, which infuriated the whoole
population and led to high school students going on hunger
strike to support the newly elected mayor, vice-mayor and
some city councilors.
Health became an issue very "visible" in newly
emancipated towns because of the prior neglect they had been
through. Popular protest in 1986 forced the local
administration to take over the town's only health post,
operated by SESP (Foundation of the Special Service of
Public Health). This protest forced the local government to
take the health unit away from the SESP foundation, and
assume the responsibility of providing for the service with
its own budget and personnel. This episode started the
process of municipalization of services--transferring to the
municipio full responsibility of the medical service. The
so called "municipalization" here resulted from multilateral
pressures from residents, the local administration, and the
state and federal governments. It was an opportunity for
local government to improve the service and to extend it to
more beneficiaries, and for the state and federal
governments thus broadening their decentralization process.
Since 1986, when the first post-emancipation local
government took office, mayors of Icapul have been doing the
opposite of what traditional mayors did. The local
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administration itself was composed of ex-political
activists, who came to power after being in the student's
movement in Fortaleza. This combination of popular pressure
and reform-minded management led to concrete improvements in
the public sector. Equally ex-activists understood that
participation had its shortcomings from their own
experience. It lengthened the decision-making process and
mobilization was difficult to maintain. The group
recognized the need for community organizing. The group
took advantage of its previous experience to foster
participation in the local government effectively. Their
experience became known throughout Brazil as a good
municipal administration. This case affected distant places
like Horizonte and Croat&, where no activists assumed
offices in the government.5
The openness of the administration changed the
political power structure in Icapuf. All local associations
worked together with public officials to formulate the
government municipal budget. They discuss and decide how to
allocate the government revenues. The mayor was no longer
the all-powerful figure whom everybody else feared. The
municipal staff had responsibilities and funds distributed
among them, the flow of information was not monopolized by
anyone in higher positions, nor was restricted to the core
group. Therefore, presence in community meetings and
75 There is the exception of the former secretary of education in Croati, who had been an activist
in the sixties and seventies.
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popular representation became worthwhile, and inhabitants
wanted to participate in local decisions. Organized
neighborhoods received benefits faster than those lacking
good representation. For instance, the local government
guided by Redonda's neighborhood association solved the
problem that impeded fishermen of stocking their product.
They needed ice to stock lobster and sell it later at a
better price than that offered by intermediaries. Fishermen
discussed their problems first locally, then introduced it
to the municipal government. The municipal Department of
Social and Economic Development negotiated funds with the
state department of social action to build an ice factory in
Redonda, which came into operation in 1992. Fishermen then
became independent from the sales intermediaries, and gained
competitiveness for their product by selling it in larger
amounts.
This success in Redonda helped stimulate participation
of the less organized communities nearby. For example, the
community of Belem had problems of land tenure for many
years. After seeing the fishermen's results, the
inhabitants of Belem also formed an association. They
discussed their problems exhaustively with a social worker
of the municipal staff, then they obtained the
administration support to negotiate with the company that
owned the land they lived on. At first, the contacts with
company managers were difficult, but the inhabitants of
Belem persisted and eventually they settled a very favorable
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agreement. The company gave them land for the housing
project. Before beginning the project, the company did a
socioeconomic survey, planned different sized houses and
utilities to meet the needs of the community. The municipal
administration is providing all public services and building
material, and community members are building the houses with
technical assistance from company architects and engineers.
Belem began to send representatives to every local meeting,
even after the matter was completely settled.76
One of the advantages of listening to local demands is
that sometimes they suggest innovative solutions to their
own problems. For example, isolated communities in Icapui,
such as Retiro Grande and Ponta Grossa previously unserved
now receive visits from nurses and doctors by motorcycle.
This was an affordable way to transport the Health
Department employees within the municipio's 400 square
kilometers of sandy soil.
One interesting aspect of the Department of Social
Development is its direct interaction with the public. The
Social Development Department functions in front of the main
square of Icapuf. During office hours, the office of the
social workers keeps its big window constantly open, so that
people from the square will feel free to come in anytime,
76 As a consequence of this episode, another very isolated community also started to organize
itself to obtain a satisfactory solution to its similar problem of land. The community of Retiro
Grande holds a small piece of shore, and has no access to the road because the manager of the big
cashew plantation around forbides them of entering the farm lands. They only can Leave their homes
during the low tide. The medical assistance also only reaches the community by motorcycle by the
shore line. When I Left, they were beginning to meet regularly to discuss their problems, and had
asked for assistance of the municipal staff, so I didn't get to see their meeting with the social
worker.
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and place their demands. They can also just walk in and
talk to the Secretary in his inner room. It is not unusual
that, after chatting for a while with the social workers,
community representatives or residents call on the Secretary
to plead their claims, or to show the benefits of their
project. Presidents and treasurers of community
associations are on hand to fill in accounting forms,
provide account balances, and report expenditures to donors.
This interaction between public personnel and the
population helps people to understand bureaucratic
procedures. It also eliminates most of the information
asymmetry between beneficiaries of government projects and
their offic4aLs., 7 Furthermore, because social workers have
the authority to solve many problems, the mayor's and
secretaries' ave more time to obtain available resources
and advance further administrative reforms.
Decentralization of decision making led to alternative
strategies for making changes and improvements. I will
discuss municipal councils next.
Municipal Councils
One major factor that enhanced participation was the
implementation of the municipal councils which were mandated
by the new Constitution of 1988.78 Few municipios responded
77 The municipal authority becomes less concentrated in the mayor and secretaries, which brings a
fair amount of decentralization to local decisions. See for information asymmetry Ostrom, Schroeder
& Wynne (1990), and Weiss (1987) for cooperation among public agencies.
78 The Child and Youth Council, the Municipal Council of Education, the Municipal Council of Health
and Sanitation, the Municipal Council of Civil Defense, and the Municipal Council of Environment.
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correctly to this mandate, especially concerning true
participation in administrative decisions. The municipal
councils in many municipios in Cear& still do not meet
regularly. Some do not enforce councils' recommendations.
Others choose weak representatives among the existing
organizations to bypass control and to allow misuse of
funds. In contrast, the three municipios I studied took the
possibilities for change seriously, but each reacted
differently to the inclusion of participatory mechanisms in
their governments. They structured their councils according
to their priorities. The so called "transparency" or
complete information about government actions in Icapul is
the highest among the three.
The Municipal Councils began in Icapul shortly after
its Organic Law was approved in 1990 by the city council--
"C&mara dos Vereadores."" Municipal councils have
delegates from each district and community, chosen from
presidents of neighborhood associations, representatives of
other organizations, church groups, and unions to present
their demands. Each department of the local government also
takes part in the municipal council of its respective area
of action. The attendance at meetings has been increasing
each year, and the task of representing local views in the
council is taken seriously by those who the communities
choose as delegates. The neighborhood associations and
79 Organic Law of Icapuf Section 1 Municipal Administration Art. 82 includes consultant, assessor
and decision bodies that might be formed by community representatives for each area. For instance,
a Municipal Council of Health, etc.
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other local associations each have their own requirement for
quorum, and the members vote on simple majority basis.
Delegates need to conform to the ideas of the people they
represent. If they do otherwise, they receive complaints
from other members and lose their position in the council.
In small towns is not difficult to see their true position
because the meetings are open to anyone. These meetings'
internal dynamics reflect the increasingly interest of
residents in the government's actions.
Besides neighborhood associations, unions, and the
municipal councils there are smaller organizations more
focused on specific problems, for example, the health
committees. Icapul's future health leaders attended the
Eighth National Conference of Health, in 1985, and brought
back the idea of health committees and SILOS (Local Systems
of Health). Each neighborhood started its own health
committee, which held monthly meetings for people to say
what needed to be done, and to evaluate previous government
actions. These meetings took place in health posts, now
distributed within walking distance of most households.
Afterwards these associations' representatives presented
demands to the Health Council.
Each municipal council held monthly meetings to
evaluate actions already undertaken, and each community
presented new demands or suggestions to guide the government
actions. All municipal councils continue to meet together
at least twice a year to deliberate about the budget. For
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instance, the Municipal Council of Education brings its
plans, the Municipal Council of Health and Sanitation its
demands, and they defend their propositions. At the end all
propositions are voted and ranked in priorities,
establishing which percentage of municipal revenue will be
dedicated to each. These meetings also point to areas that
changed with the direct demand from the beneficiaries.
These participatory mechanisms launched in public
administration opened opportunities for previously excluded
groups, such as inhabitants of faraway districts, to
participate in the local government. Icapul's local health
committees, and the school collegiate body which replaced
Redonda's elementary school principal, represent further
steps in the direction of a broader participation in local
government. The interaction between administrators and
popular delegates in this forum significantly affects the
public policy outcomes. Solutions are much more grounded on
what is really going on. Technical solutions are discussed
in simple terms, and this helps to generate an effective
exchange of information among all segments involved. It
also eliminates problems of misunderstanding among
professional staff and the general population.
Simultaneously it reveals simpler ways of doing things.
One funny episode concerning the sanitary conditions of
communities illustrates this interaction. Information about
the spread of parasites through animals was disseminated in
the community of Redonda by children going to each house to
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ask people to stop the tradition of keeping livestock in the
house. After a science class thought them more, these
environmentally conscious children became very concerned
with the consequences of pigs roaming on the beach, and made
a concerted effort to change this practice.80
Dissemination of Public Management Innovations
In this section, I will demonstrate how open
communities increased the speed of change. Good performance
itself triggers more efficiency within the administration
with a catalytic effect. Reform happens in part by
spreading information about what is successful elsewhere,
through spontaneous networks, like kinship ties. For
instance, a cousin of Icapul's Secretary of Health brought
the news of Icapulfs educational innovation to Iguatd.
Another relative, a dentist cousin of another Icapul doctor
heard the story of how Icapul had started "SILOS." He
influenced the Secretary of Health to apply the same
principles in the health system of Croat&. Relatives of the
Croat& mayor told him about the successful dental care
prevention program in Guaraciaba do Norte. Then, he decided
to bring the same people to lower the rates of cavities,
lost, and treated teeth (CPO-D) presented by Croat&
children.81- The average of seven CPO-D found in the survey
80 I never sa a pig on the beach while I was there, and I think it is a sign of success because it
is usual to find chicken, pigs, and goats on the streets and on the beach in other places I visited
in Ceard.
81 CPO-D is the rate of bad teeth in the population. The program of Guaraciaba do Norte appeared in
0 Povo, an important Fortaleza netwpaper.
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in Guaraciaba do Norte really worried specialists because
the World Health organization (WHO) sets an ideal rate of
three CPO-D.82 During my research, a similar survey was
being conducted in Croat&, and the dentists in charge were
expecting an even worse result. They had started a
preventive program to teach to brush teeth, and to stress
the habit of brushing teeth three times a day. Schools
started fluorine applications weekly. Community meetings
started discussing other measures to improve dental health
with the professionals, as they had being doing about
educational problems.
Professional ties also help to spread innovations, for
instance, the mayors of Horizonte and Icapul got acquainted
during APRECE, the mayoral association meetings. Although
they belong to different political parties, they talked
about Icapui's innovations. As a result, Horizonte teachers
visited an Icapul school to observe how they made their own
text books.83 Medical Meetings also spread the reforming
trend of "municipalization" of services through good
experiences that participants presented. It is significant
how the exchange of information in these occasions leads to
a proliferation of efficient administrative actions. For
instance, the knowledge of other processes and experiences
82 There is no data for the average rate in the state to make comparisons with other places.
83 It was a common effort of students and teachers to respond to constant delays in the distribution
of school didactic materials by FAE.
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made the adoption of SILOS principles in the local system of
health much easier after tested in places like Icapui.
The young professionals recruited to work in these
three municipios knew current ideas of primary health care
and education. They participated actively in professional
networks. They had information about experiences in other
cities in the state or beyond, and used it to foster
administrative progresses. This had a major effect in the
municipios' performance, e.g., the influence of preventive
care in the system of health adopted in Icapui. Other
municipios that did not have this professional background
had more trouble carrying out innovative government.
Horizonte and Croat& had no spontaneous return of
educated people as Icapui, neither they had the ideological
commitment of the Icapu£ group. Nevertheless, their local
governments had a platform to orient the development of
their municipios and they used some effective strategies to
make up for this lack. Therefore, besides paying higher
salaries and other incentives to keep qualified staff, they
also gave more autonomy to the high-ranking employees to
stimulate their creativity and commitment. The mayor of
Croata advertised positions for doctors in Fortaleza's
newspapers, with wages calculated in dollars to attract
medical professionals to his municipio. Otherwise, CroatA
would not have been able to offer proper medical care to its
inhabitants.
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Horizonte used a different strategy. The mayor opened
a public contest to hire teachers and doctors, offering in
addition to high salaries, the opportunity of a flexible
schedule. In this way, the municipio attracted qualified
professionals, who could keep their jobs in Fortaleza as
well. For example, one doctor accumulated his 20 hours a
week doing his ten hour rounds on weekends. Another one
worked only Thursdays and Fridays. The schedules were
distributed so that a doctor would always be on duty there.
The need for expertise to deliver good services
explains why the mayor of Croat& chose experts for the
departments of health and education even if they were from
different political parties. Although a PSDB member, the
mayor chose the Secretary of Education from PMDB. The
reason for this choice was the competence of the secretary
to solve the problems and give the improvements expected to
happen in Croat&. For example, at its beginning, the
administration following the recommendation of this
secretary called a meeting with representatives from all
localities to discuss the priority problems to be tackled
from 1989 to 1992. The first meeting was held in 1989 to
identify all localities' problems and expectations, so that
they would be included in the municipio's government plan.
The former Secretary of Education coordinated this first
meeting, and a second one--"Meeting for the Municipal
Development of Croat&," in January of 1992. This second
meeting evaluated the general administrative efficiency, and
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concluded that the government had followed its plan closely.
Periodical public opinion surveys conducted during the first
three years of the administration have shown a high degree
of satisfaction with the government.84
To sum up, this chapter describes how the struggle for
emancipation helped Icapul, Croat&, and Horizonte to unify
their communities, giving people experience in organizing
and protesting. This experience translated in constant
pressure on the public sector for administrative performance
and forced mayors to incorporate public participation in the
local government with excellent results.
84 The Brazilian Institute of Public Opinion - IBOPE conducted these surveys with the following
results: n 1990, 89X of the people interviewed classified the local government either good (49%) or
excellent(40%). In 1991, 94X considered good (53X) or excellent (41X) The evaluation respectively
ranked health excellent (572) and good (32%), and education (59X) excellent and (382) good. In
1992, the number of people satisfied grew to 97X, the ones considering the administration good were
64%, and 33X ranked it as excellent.
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CONCLUSIONS
Icapui, Croat&, and Horizonte presented outstanding
local governments. They solved many public sector problems
common to most Brazilian municipios. Several factors
converged to make their local administrations more
responsible, efficient, and democratic. First, the struggle
for emancipation brought cohesiveness around shared ideals.
During the process of emancipation the residents and the
local government learned to interact and work together to
solve local problems. The struggle also taught inhabitants
of these municipios the value of collective action. Then,
popular organizations, such as neighborhood associations,
workers' unions, church-oriented groups efficiently demanded
more schools, medical care, roads and other services. The
protest and mobilization before emancipation turned into a
steady pressure on the new governments to produce solutions
to all pending demands, mainly concerning the lack of basic
public services. The struggle produced delayed effects
enhancing participation.
All three governments incorporated public
participation. Each government did this differently, but in
all three it improved administrative performance. These new
governments gradually banished traditional politics and
included popular organizations in the decision-making and
ruling of their towns. They avoided previous corruption,
patronage, and clientelism by spreading public services to
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all inhabitants, breaking pre-emancipation links with
nepotism and influence-peddling. The "soft sectors" were
the root of most problems in the public sector. Thus, the
universalization of medical assistance and education for all
children became strategic goals to dismantle old values in
politics.
Participation inserted in public management gave these
governments constant feedback and evaluation about whether
proposed actions had solved problems, while helping to plan
future interventions. The process of planning collectively
in the municipal councils presented a creative way of
sharing information and maximizing resources between the
government and the population. At the same time,
governments gained legitimacy in the eyes of the local
residents. Technicians, public employees and population
shared their knowledge before reaching an agreement about
which policy was to be enforced. Decisions about how
resources and revenues would be distributed in the municipio
took an important part of the planning and approval of the
municipal budget. This process also created mechanisms of
popular checking on government actions and expenditures.
Although these participatory practices seemed to follow
an arduous and slow process, the enforcement of decisions
proved easier and compliance proved greater than if less
democratic decision-making process had been used.
Deliberation on discordant issues presented some problems
for the communities involved, and required the officials'
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and the population's persistence. People became more
cooperative during the exercise of sharing decisions. They
were willing to participate, pay taxes and fees because they
felt partially responsible for the government performance
because they were participating in it. Optimistic
expectations about local government performance set an
important standard to guide procedures and to attain goals
shared by all segments of these municipios' population. In
these three cases, public regulations reflected the general
concerns of the population. Thus, even taxation that
usually evokes strong reactions, became much easier to
enforce. A mayor put it this way: "When the population knew
why the government was asking for more money, collecting
taxes was no longer a big problem."
Third, Icapuf, Croat&, and Horizonte used the
guidelines in the new Constitution to transform their
conduct, adopting institutional innovations in their local
governments. Progressive municipios used their autonomy
differently than most other local governments. They used
the opportunities opened by the national fiscal reform to
explore untapped revenue. Their administrations received
direct popular pressure to institute decentralized services.
Decentralization gave financial support for many municipal
reforms. For instance, now they went beyond charging
property taxes and other local sources. They also gathered
extra-funding from federal and state governments, or
international agencies and NGOs to do specific projects.
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Locally, decentralization of decisions led to better
coordination of actions among all sectors of the local
government. Some officials were able to push innovations
further based n delegation of decision power to others.
Each sector improved its own performance, thus assuring the
general efficiency of the government. But, decentralization
is not enough. Cooperation among local managers and the
inclusion of new networks such as professional ties, besides
kinship and political party proved an efficient way to bring
support, and for spreading good experiences.
Fourth, the incorporation of qualified professionals
into public administration reflected the new tendency for
modernizing the public sector. The process of recruiting
and keeping professionals in the interior brings success for
local governments. Strategic solutions such as public
contests to hire civil employees, payment of high salaries,
and periodical training played a key role to advance reform.
These solutions showed professionalism and merit as criteria
of selection, thus establishing political credibility for
the administrations. It was a politically astute way of
obtaining administrative efficiency. Simultaneously the
local government was detaching old-style entrenched
politicians from threatening its performance through the
action of loyal allies, who might sabotage the modernizing
reforms.
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ANNEX ONE
TABLE 5 INTERVIEWS in MUNICIPALITIES
CROATA HORIZONTE ICAPUI IGUATO UITERIANOPOLIS
MAYOR 1 1 2 1 1
VICE-MAYORS 1
CITY COUNCILPERSON 2
SEC. ADMINISTRATION 1
SEC. AGRICULTURE
COMDECS
EATERCE
IBAMA
SEC. EDUCATION
1
1
4
1
1
1
1
1
ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF5
SCHOOL PRINCIPAL 2
TEACHERS 8
LIBRARIAN
FINANCE 1
SEC. HEALTH 1
HEALTH AGENTS 3
COORDINATORS OF H.A.1
HEALTH SUPERVISORS 1
DOCTORS
BIOCHEMISTRY
NURSES
3
1
2
DENTISTS 2
CRUTAC INTERNS 4
SEC. SOCIAL DEVELOP.1
NOTARY 1
COELCE
CATHOLIC PRIEST 1
TOTAL 49
1
4
1
4
1
2
1
1
2
2
1
26
2
3
2
1
5
2
3
8
3
9
1
2
1
8
1
3
4
1
2
1
5
4
185
1
3
2
2
2
4
2
2
1
1
2
72
186
26
85 Brazilian Institute for the Environment.
86 An engineer of the Cear& Electrification Company.
93
1
1
1
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
1
15

TABLE 6 INTERVIEWS in FORTALEZA
GOVERNOR 2
STATE DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE 387
EDUCATION 688
HEALTH 389
PLANNING 990
SOCIAL ACTION AND WORK 891
TOTAL 44
TABLE 7 POPULATION GENDER
CROATA HORIZONTE ICAPU
Male 7,322 9,329 6,971
Female 7,504 8,933 6,694
87 At the Ceari Agriculture and Technical Extension Service
municfpios, I interviewed two directors, two veterinarians,
and an economist from the Center of Agriculture Studies and
(EKATERCE), and in its agencies in the
six agronomists, two zoo-technicians,
Research (CEPA).
88 I had a long interview with six school supervisors.
89 I interviewed three Coordinators for the Regional Directories (DERES)
90 interviewed the Secretary of Planning, and at the Cearh Institute of Planning Foundation
(IPLANCE) I interviewed the president, five assessors and three directors of Departments.
91 1 interviewed the Secretary of Social Actions and Work, three assistants, the head of the Social
Action Foundation (FAS), an assessor of the Technical Assistance (ADITEC), the head of the Center
for Handcrafts (CEART), the head of the Department of Community Action (DAC), the head of the
Division of Comnunities (DC), four social workers and two sociologists. I also interviewed three
coordinators of the Drought Relief Program in the Civil Defense State Counci! (CEDEC).
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